Knowledge Tree
phenomenal properties
Also known as: phenomenal qualities, Phenomenal Qualities
Facts (75)
Sources
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 25 facts
quoteDavid Chalmers defines protophenomenal properties as "special properties that are not themselves phenomenal (there is nothing it is like to have them) but that can collectively constitute phenomenal properties."
claimThe arguments regarding the irreducibility of consciousness postulate an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal accounts, implying an ontological distinction between phenomenal and physical properties.
claimA non-reductive naturalistic theory of consciousness may propose natural supervenience of phenomenal properties on physical properties, provided it incorporates additional natural principles not found in physical law.
claimDavid Chalmers rejects his earlier interpretation of phenomenal properties as information structure because it is difficult to see how they are metaphysically necessary rather than brute nomic principles.
perspectiveThe author of the text argues that the 'hard problem' of consciousness is largely a problem of definition, as 'functional' can be defined in various ways and is not the only way to distinguish between physical and phenomenal properties.
claimPhenomenal properties of consciousness might represent a separate ontic category obeying 'psychophysical principles' that differ from those governing physical properties, while specifying how phenomenal or protophenomenal properties depend on physical properties.
claimDavid Chalmers suggests that the intrinsic properties of the physical world are themselves phenomenal properties, an interpretation derived from the relationship between percepts and intrinsic essence in Russellian Monism.
claimIf David Chalmers's interpretation of Russellian monism is true, a modal argument based on the supposition of a parallel world that is physically identical to ours but lacks phenomenal properties would lose its logical basis, as such a world would be logically impossible.
claimAspect dualism suggests that the fundamental intrinsic essence of both mind and matter might be identical to phenomenal, mind-like properties, rather than matter-like properties such as spatiotemporal location, mass, energy, and causal determination.
claimDavid Chalmers relates 'property dualism' to both the phenomenal and physical properties of an individual, and to emergent ontic properties of an underlying, more fundamental ontic substance.
claimThe hard problem of consciousness, as discussed in the context of the Springer Nature chapter, involves the question of the nature of the correlation between phenomenal and physical properties of consciousness.
claimVon Stillfried argues that even if the identity-thesis of intrinsic essence and phenomenal properties is true, it fails to explain why humans experience things in specific ways or the extent to which the relation between the physical and the phenomenal is contingent.
claimA quantum theoretical interpretation of phenomenal properties using quantum wave functions might explain the fusion of microphenomenal properties into holistic macrophenomenal properties.
accountThe conceivability argument imagines a parallel universe that is an exact physical copy of our own but completely lacks phenomenal properties.
claimSome ontologies treated as 'monisms' suggest that both physical and phenomenal properties supervene on, or are aspects of, a more fundamental ontic category or principle, thereby avoiding the problem of treating them as two separate existing categories.
claimDavid Chalmers does not consider a priori entailment between phenomenal and physical properties to be a necessary requirement for his theory of consciousness, preferring instead to rely on a contingent principle to explain the relationship.
claimSubstance dualism theories, including interactionism and epiphenomenalism, fail to explain the emergence of phenomenal properties from the physical as a distinct ontic substance.
quote“it is not easy to see how these will be metaphysically necessary rather than brute nomic principles”
claimRussellian monism can be interpreted as physicalism, aspect dualism, or idealism depending on the presumed relationship between inscrutables (the intrinsic properties of relata) and phenomenal properties.
claimA naturalistic theory of consciousness may amount to a 'physicalist' account of consciousness without being 'materialist' if it incorporates additional ontic categories or principles to explain physical observables and phenomenal properties.
claimAssuming the intrinsic essence of relata is logically necessary would preclude the existence of zombies, because it would make a physically identical world without phenomenal properties impossible.
claimDavid Chalmers defines the physical as properties that can be sufficiently described from a third-person perspective, in contrast to phenomenal properties which can only be described from a first-person view.
claimRussellian monism is not affected by the conceivability argument or the knowledge argument, and it supports a naturalist view on consciousness while integrating phenomenal and physical properties.
claimDavid Chalmers's identification of phenomenal properties with the intrinsic essence or quiddities of relata is not logically necessary, as there may be other candidates for intrinsic essence that are currently unknown.
claimDavid Chalmers transforms the epistemological explanatory gap into an ontological gap between physical and phenomenal properties by arguing for the necessity of additional ontic categories.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 19 facts
claimNeutral monism is considered a reductive position because it explains the presence of phenomenal properties by reference to a more basic, non-phenomenal and non-physical substance.
perspectiveWeak reductionists argue that phenomenal properties possess an inherent nature that underwrites first-person access, asserting that explanation must stop at this fundamental nature.
claimIn a dual-aspect view, phenomenal properties are not reducible to physical properties, and the instantiation of these properties may depend on the configuration of the basic substance (e.g., a brain vs. a table).
claimPanpsychism holds that phenomenal properties are basic to all matter and potentially present at all times as a property of a more basic substance.
claimWeak reductionism relies on a claim of parsimony and a commitment to physicalism, despite the lack of evidence that phenomenal properties are physical.
claimPanpsychism posits that phenomenal properties are the intrinsic categorical bases for the relational, dispositional properties described in physics, implying that everything physical has an underlying phenomenal nature.
claimIn dualist philosophy, it is considered metaphysically possible for a physical substrate to exist without phenomenal properties, which suggests that phenomenal properties have ontological independence, even though they cannot exist on their own.
claimTheories positing phenomenal properties as the categorical bases of matter do not conflict with physics because these properties exist at a level below the range of relational physical description.
claimThe identification of phenomenal properties with neurological properties is considered a 'brute identity' that lacks precedent, unlike foundational physical identities such as the unification of electricity and magnetism.
claimOne proposed solution to the gap in physical theory is to posit phenomenal properties as the categorical bases of basic physical matter, or to posit a neutral substance that realizes phenomenal properties under the right circumstances.
claimProperty dualism holds that the conscious mind is not a separate substance from the physical brain, but that phenomenal properties are nonphysical properties of the brain.
claimNonreductive and dualistic views agree with weak reductionism that phenomenal properties underwrite first-person access, but they reject the idea that these properties are physical.
claimConsciousness epiphenomenalism is a view that accepts the causal closure of physics but maintains that phenomenal properties are metaphysically distinct from physical properties, asserting that while physical events can cause conscious properties, conscious properties cannot cause physical events.
claimThe Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) is often explained by the assertion that phenomenal properties are embedded within phenomenal concepts, which allows these properties to be accessible through introspected experience.
claimDual aspect theory, neutral monism, and panpsychism hold that phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to basic physical properties, but may reduce to a more basic substance that possesses both physical and phenomenal properties.
claimUnder epiphenomenalism, phenomenal properties are lawfully correlated with physical properties, ensuring that a phenomenal property of a particular type occurs whenever a brain event of a corresponding type occurs, even though the phenomenal property does not cause the physical behavior.
claimA dual-aspect view of consciousness holds that there is one basic underlying substance that possesses both physical and phenomenal properties.
claimA dualist view of consciousness exists that rejects the causal closure of physics while maintaining concordance with basic physical theory by assigning phenomenal properties the role of collapsing the wave function through observation.
claimEmergent dualism, as referenced by C.D. Broad in 1925, posits that phenomenal properties might emerge from a combination of nonphenomenal properties.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 14 facts
claimIf physical structure requires intrinsic realizers to exist, then phenomenal or protophenomenal realizers would possess an essential explanatory role rather than being epiphenomenal or overdetermining.
claimPhysical properties have realizers that possess phenomenal or protophenomenal properties.
claimProperty dualism asserts that both phenomenal properties and their specific instances are non-physical and fundamental.
claimNon-reductive physicalism, as described by Donald Davidson in 1980, asserts that phenomenal properties are not identical to physical properties, but that specific instances of phenomenal properties are fully constituted by instances of physical properties.
claimProtophenomenal properties are defined as intrinsic properties that are neither physical nor phenomenal, but are capable of constituting or causally producing phenomenal properties when combined appropriately.
claimConscious states are characterized by subjectivity and particular qualities known as qualia or phenomenal qualities.
claimPhenomenal intentionality theories assert that the phenomenal qualities of a person's experience, including feelings of intention, will, and understanding, fully determine their intentional states, or determine them in conjunction with physical relations to the environment.
claimDual-aspect monists argue that phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are intrinsic.
perspectiveDual-aspect monists argue that consciousness and its phenomenal qualities are intrinsic because they are known in themselves, beyond their relations to causes, effects, or other things.
claimThe deflationary view of subjects holds that the unity of consciousness can be accounted for by relations among phenomenal qualities themselves, rather than by a distinct subject.
claimPhenomenal qualities, such as the experience of redness, can occur in the absence of corresponding physical objects, such as in dreams or hallucinations.
claimPhenomenal or protophenomenal properties are the only intrinsic properties known to exist.
claimDual-aspect monism is defined by the view that phenomenal properties are either fundamental or constituted by protophenomenal properties, and that physical properties are relations between or structures of these phenomenal or protophenomenal properties.
claimDual-aspect monism posits that the broad principle of physical causal closure is compatible with the theory because the principle does not specify whether causal relations or structures possess intrinsic realizers, such as phenomenal or protophenomenal ones.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 4 facts
claimDavid Chalmers asserts that phenomenal properties exist beyond formal properties, and these properties distinguish the phenomenal realization of information from its physical realization.
claimDavid Chalmers suggests that the core of phenomenal irreducibility might lie in the fact that some phenomenal properties, such as hue properties, lack structural expression.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers leans toward the view that the irreducibility of consciousness lies in the independence of phenomenal structure from the physical domain and the intrinsic nature of phenomenal properties, which contrasts with the relational nature of physical concepts.
claimDavid Chalmers notes that the structural properties of experience, such as the geometry of a visual field, are more amenable to physical explanation than other phenomenal properties, yet still require a nonreductive principle to bridge the explanatory gap.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 3 facts
claimPhilosopher Raamy Majeed argued in 2016 that the hard problem of consciousness is associated with two explanatory targets: physical processing giving rise to experiences with a phenomenal character, and the nature of phenomenal qualities themselves.
perspectiveElizabeth Irvine argues that phenomenal properties (properties of consciousness) do not exist in our common-sense view of the world.
quoteWolfgang Fasching stated: 'Today there is a strong tendency to simply equate consciousness with the qualia. Yet there is clearly something not quite right about this. The "itchiness of itches" and the "hurtfulness of pain" are qualities we are conscious of. So philosophy of mind tends to treat consciousness as if it consisted simply of the contents of consciousness (the phenomenal qualities), while it really is precisely consciousness of contents, the very givenness of whatever is subjectively given. And therefore the problem of consciousness does not pertain so much to some alleged "mysterious, nonpublic objects", i.e. objects that seem to be only "visible" to the respective subject, but rather to the nature of "seeing" itself (and in today's philosophy of mind astonishingly little is said about the latter).'
Panpsychism - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 2 facts
claimProtophenomenal properties are defined as properties that logically entail phenomenal properties (a functional definition) and are themselves neither physical nor phenomenal (a negative definition).
claimThe 'phenomenal powers view' asserts that phenomenal properties like pain or pleasure are intrinsically powerful, meaning the feeling of pain necessarily motivates avoidance behavior due to its specific phenomenal character.
The Compatibility of Christianity with Panpsychism, Part 1 theologycommons.gcu.edu Sep 2, 2025 2 facts
perspectivePanpsychists argue that the definition of the 'physical' could potentially include what are considered phenomenal properties.
claimLanell M. Mason's research interests include philosophy of mind, phenomenal properties, perceptual epistemology, and the metaphysics of virtue ethics.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 Edition) plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 2 facts
claimPhenomenal properties are the properties that characterize conscious experience, while protophenomenal properties are the properties involved in proto-consciousness.
claimA more precise definition of protophenomenal properties is that they are properties which, in certain combinations, transparently account for the existence of consciousness, meaning one could in principle deduce phenomenal properties from knowledge of protophenomenal properties (Chalmers 2015; Goff 2015, 2017).
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 18, 2017 2 facts
claimProtophenomenal properties are defined as properties that in certain combinations transparently account for the existence of consciousness, meaning one could in principle move a priori from knowing facts about protophenomenal properties to knowing facts about phenomenal properties.
referencePaul Coates and Sarn Coleman edited 'Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness', published by Oxford University Press in 2015.
Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Consciousness and the Intermediate ... frontiersin.org Apr 17, 2018 1 fact
claimThe hypothesis that physical properties are different from subjective (phenomenal) properties is unproven and serves as the foundation for the 'hard problem' framework.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Jun 18, 2004 1 fact
perspectiveNelkin (1989) and Rosenthal (1991) challenge the view that the functional and motivational roles of conscious affective states, such as pleasures and pains, are intrinsic to their experiential character and inseparable from their qualitative and phenomenal properties.