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principle of physical causal closure
Also known as: principle of physical causal closure, physical causal closure
Facts (33)
Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 33 facts
claimThe principle of physical causal closure is often supported by the law of conservation of energy, as some argue that non-physical effects on the physical world would add energy to the system, violating conservation.
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that their position is less unattractive than the alternatives, specifically claiming that physicalism is refuted by the epistemic gap and interactionism is refuted by physical causal closure.
claimEpiphenomenalism is a philosophical position that reconciles non-physical consciousness with the principle of physical causal closure by asserting that non-physical consciousness has no physical effects.
claimThe argument from physical causal closure requires non-physicalists to choose between epiphenomenalism, overdetermination, or the denial of physical causal closure.
perspectiveMany philosophers find it more plausible that there is an unidentified error in arguments against physicalism than to accept that phenomenal consciousness is epiphenomenal, an overdeterminer, or violates physical causal closure.
claimOverdetermination dualism is compatible with physical causal closure, similar to epiphenomenalism, but differs by allowing mental states to affect physical states.
claimSubjective idealism interprets the argument from physical causal closure not as evidence of physical events having sufficient physical causes, but as evidence of regularities holding between various kinds of perceptions or experiences.
claimThe dominance of physicalism in the philosophy of consciousness is based on three arguments: the argument from mind–brain correlations, the argument from physical causal closure, and the argument from previous explanatory successes of science.
claimThe broad version of the principle of physical causal closure claims that every physical effect has a sufficient cause whose structural properties are all physical, or that the only causal structure needed to explain physical effects is physical causal structure.
claimDual-aspect monism argues that the narrow version of the principle of physical causal closure is false because purely physical causes would be purely structural entities, and structures cannot exist without being realized by something with intrinsic properties, analogous to how software cannot exist without hardware.
perspectivePhysicalists are often motivated by the strength of arguments for physicalism, particularly the argument from physical causal closure, rather than just identifying specific errors in arguments against physicalism.
claimDual-aspect monism addresses the problem of physical causal closure by claiming that consciousness, as the realizer of physical structure, possesses an explanatory role compatible with physical causal closure, as argued by Stoljar (2001) and Chalmers (2003, 2013) and Alter and Nagasawa (2012).
claimThe principle of physical causal closure rules out interactionist dualism, which is the view that non-physical conscious states can cause physical effects that would not result from physical causes alone.
claimThe principle of physical causal closure allows for the possibility that some physical events, such as quantum events, are truly random and lack a cause, while maintaining that all caused physical events, including human behavior, have complete physical explanations.
claimThe principle of physical causal closure asserts that every physical event that has a cause has a complete physical explanation.
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that the lack of elegance in their theory is a moot point if competing theories like physicalism and interactionism are already refuted by the epistemic gap and physical causal closure.
claimThe argument for physicalism states that if the principle of physical causal closure is correct, then epiphenomenalism and overdetermination are unacceptable, and conscious states must be physical to cause physical behavior without overdetermination.
claimInteractionist dualism is ruled out by the broad version of the principle of physical causal closure because interactionist dualism claims that some physical events, such as human behavior, require explanation through fundamental psychophysical laws rather than physical laws.
claimNon-physicalists are required to address arguments for physicalism, specifically the argument from physical causal closure, in addition to providing their own arguments against physicalism.
claimOverdetermination dualism requires that the overdetermination be systematic, meaning behavior always has a sufficient physical cause in addition to its mental cause, and the physical cause never fails in a way that allows the mental cause to act alone, thereby preserving physical causal closure.
claimThe principle of conservation of energy is insufficient to establish the principle of physical causal closure.
claimThe argument from physiology posits that physical causal closure is supported by the lack of evidence for non-physical forces influencing the brain and body, alongside progress toward a complete physical explanation of all biological processes.
claimThere are four possible positions on mental causation: interactionism (which implies violation of physical causal closure), epiphenomenalism, overdetermination, and physicalism.
claimThe narrow version of the principle of physical causal closure claims that every physical effect has a purely physical cause, or a cause with only physical or physically constituted properties.
referenceThe argument from physical causal closure, supported by Kim (1989), Papineau (2001), Melnyk (2003), and Montero and Papineau (2016), focuses on how consciousness affects the brain, the body, and the physical world in general.
claimA primary argument against epiphenomenalism is that phenomenal states appear to cause physical actions, to which epiphenomenalists respond that appearances can be false and that physical causal closure takes precedence.
referencePhenomenalism faces a conflict with the principle of physical causal closure that is essentially identical to the conflict faced by substance dualism, according to Pelczar (2019).
claimThe principle of physical causal closure undermines the historical argument for non-physical consciousness by providing a complete physical explanation for human functions and behaviors.
procedureThe argument for physicalism regarding mental causation consists of four premises: 1. Physical causal closure (every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause), 2. Non-epiphenomenalism (conscious states have physical effects), 3. Non-overdetermination (physical effects of conscious states do not have more than one sufficient cause), and 4. Physicalism (conscious states are physical).
claimUnder phenomenalism, the mental is either epiphenomenal (does not affect physical potentials), affects physical potentials in an overdetermining way, or requires denying physical causal closure.
claimInteractionism is incompatible with the principle of physical causal closure because it denies that physical behavior has sufficient physical causes.
claimEmpirical confirmation of the Chalmers and McQueen hypothesis would not confirm dualism, but it would demonstrate the possibility of a causal role for non-physical consciousness that is compatible with physics, thereby weakening the evidence for physical causal closure.
claimDual-aspect monism posits that the broad principle of physical causal closure is compatible with the theory because the principle does not specify whether causal relations or structures possess intrinsic realizers, such as phenomenal or protophenomenal ones.