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Phenomenal Concept Strategy
Also known as: Phenomenal Concept Strategy, phenomenal concepts strategy, phenomenal concept strategy, PCS
Facts (10)
Sources
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 5 facts
claimThe phenomenal concepts strategy distinguishes between two types of concepts: the third-personal physical concept used in neuroscience and the first-personal 'phenomenal concept' which identifies conscious states in a subjectively direct manner.
claimThe 'phenomenal concepts strategy' (PCS) posits that the hard problem of consciousness is not caused by a dualism of facts (phenomenal and physical), but rather by a dualism of concepts that identify fully physical conscious states.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that there is an 'undischarged phenomenal element' within the weakly reductive view of consciousness, suggesting that the phenomenal concepts strategy fails to provide a plausible explanation of how phenomenal concepts reveal what experience is like for a subject.
claimThe Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) is often explained by the assertion that phenomenal properties are embedded within phenomenal concepts, which allows these properties to be accessible through introspected experience.
procedureA weakly reductive view of consciousness proceeds through the following steps: (1) identify stimuli that reliably trigger reports of phenomenally conscious states from subjects, (2) identify neural processes reliably correlated with those reported experiences, (3) argue based on parsimony that the reported conscious state is identical to the neural state, (4) accept the identity for its explanatory fruitfulness regarding mental causation, and (5) apply the phenomenal concepts strategy to explain why the identity remains counterintuitive.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 18, 2017 2 facts
claimBrian McLaughlin (2016) defends physicalism against Thomas Nagel’s argument by utilizing the phenomenal concept strategy.
claimThe phenomenal concept strategy, advocated by Brian Loar (1990), David Papineau (1998), and Eva Diaz-Leon (2010), is a form of physicalism that asserts there is no explanatory entailment from the physical to the mental.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimWeak reductionists use the "phenomenal concepts strategy" to explain the difference between third-person scientific observation and first-person introspection, arguing that the hard problem of consciousness arises from a dualism of concepts rather than a dualism of properties or substances.
David Ludwig (Wageningen University and Research): Publications ... philpeople.org 1 fact
claimProponents of the phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) face a dilemma: either phenomenal concepts or physical concepts allow us to conceive phenomenal states as they are in themselves, which implies that if phenomenal concepts allow this, then phenomenal states are nonphysical states.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 Edition) plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 1 fact
claimBrian McLaughlin responds to Thomas Nagel's argument by utilizing the phenomenal concept strategy, a popular method for defending physicalism.