Knowledge Tree
knowledge argument
Facts (29)
Sources
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 8 facts
claimThe knowledge argument posits that if Harpo, a scientist who knows all physical facts about hearing but cannot hear, undergoes surgery to gain the ability to hear, he learns something new regarding the qualitative or phenomenal nature of sound.
claimThe knowledge argument establishes at least a state or property dualism because the facts Harpo learns about the nature of experience are non-physical.
perspectiveThe 'ability' response to the knowledge argument claims that Harpo does not acquire new factual knowledge, but rather 'knowledge how,' which is the ability to respond directly to sounds.
claimThe 'knowledge argument' is a category of argument against physicalism based on the existence of qualia.
claimHoward Robinson authored 'From Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance: Resurrecting the Mind', published by Cambridge University Press in 2016.
perspectiveA second line of response to the knowledge argument is that Harpo's new knowledge is factual, but it is not knowledge of a new fact; rather, it is a new way of grasping something he already knew.
referenceThe knowledge argument is referenced in Jackson (1982) and Robinson (1982).
claimThe knowledge argument against physicalism utilizes a thought experiment involving a scientist named Harpo who lacks a specific sensory modality from birth but possesses complete scientific knowledge of that modality.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 5 facts
claimThomas Nagel proposed the idea of devising a language that could explain to a person blind from birth what it is like to see, a proposal which the knowledge argument implies would be impossible.
claimDavid Chalmers believes that when Mary, the neuroscientist in the knowledge argument, sees the color red for the first time, she gains new knowledge of 'what red looks like' that is distinct from and irreducible to her prior physical knowledge of the brain or visual system.
claimA stronger form of the knowledge argument claims that Mary would lack knowledge of an objective, non-physical fact about the world—specifically 'what red looks like'—which can only be learned through direct experience (qualia).
claimThe knowledge argument, or Mary's Room, is a thought experiment involving a neuroscientist named Mary who has lived in a black-and-white room and knows everything about the brain and color perception, but has never seen color.
perspectiveThomas Nagel holds a physicalist position and disagrees with the knowledge argument in its stronger and/or weaker forms.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 5 facts
claimThomas Nagel's example regarding the impossibility of knowing what it feels like to be a bat supports the same rationale as the knowledge argument, suggesting that physical knowledge does not capture the subjective experience.
claimThe 'knowledge argument' posits that knowledge about the physical correlates of phenomenal experience does not equate to knowledge about what it feels like to have that experience.
claimThe knowledge argument against physicalism requires further definitions to distinguish between 'narrowly' and 'broadly' physical facts to be effective.
claimDavid Chalmers observes that the knowledge argument by itself does not refute physicalism because experience might supervene on the physical, meaning experience could be explicable in terms of physical facts.
claimRussellian monism is not affected by the conceivability argument or the knowledge argument, and it supports a naturalist view on consciousness while integrating phenomenal and physical properties.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 4 facts
claimThe knowledge argument, the conceivability argument, and the explanatory argument are the primary arguments against physicalism.
claimThe knowledge argument asserts that consciousness is not physical because knowledge of consciousness cannot be deduced from physical knowledge.
claimThomas Nagel (1974) and Frank Jackson (1982) proposed the most discussed versions of the knowledge argument.
claimFrank Jackson's version of the knowledge argument utilizes a thought experiment about a scientist named Mary who possesses complete physical knowledge of color vision while living in a black-and-white room, despite having never seen color.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 2 facts
referenceFrank Jackson authored the article 'What Mary didn’t Know,' published in the Journal of Philosophy in 1986.
claimThe continued conceivability of spectrum inversion, the persistence of the 'other minds' problem, the plausibility of the 'knowledge argument' (Jackson 1982), and the implausibility of functional characterizations suggest that no functional characterization of consciousness is available.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Jun 18, 2004 2 facts
claimThe knowledge argument and zombie arguments aim to reach an anti-physicalist conclusion about consciousness by highlighting the apparent limits of understanding qualitative conscious experience through third-person physical accounts of brain processes.
claimFrank Jackson expressed a contrary view to his earlier knowledge argument in his 1998 and 2004 publications.
Resolving the evolutionary paradox of consciousness link.springer.com Apr 1, 2024 1 fact
claimFormal arguments against physicalism include the knowledge argument proposed by Jackson in 1982, the conceivability or zombie argument proposed by Chalmers in 1996, and the explanatory gap argument proposed by Levine in 1983.
What is hard about the “hard problem of consciousness”? philosophy.stackexchange.com Nov 18, 2020 1 fact
claimThe 'Hard Problem' of consciousness claim is built on the same conceptual notions as Frank Jackson's 'Knowledge Argument', which is also known as 'Mary’s Room' or 'Mary the Color Scientist'.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 1 fact
claimPaul Churchland's arguments regarding luminescence rely on intuitions about the conscious experience of light, specifically appealing to the 'visibility' of light, the 'visual point of view', the 'knowledge argument' (blind Mary), and the 'zombie' argument (a universe physically identical to ours but dark).