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immaterial mind
Also known as: immaterial mind, immaterial soul
Facts (13)
Sources
Dualism, Physicalism, and Philosophy of Mind - Capturing Christianity capturingchristianity.com Dec 11, 2019 4 facts
perspectiveAlexander Rosenberg argues that physicalism requires the rejection of the existence of a self, because a self could only exist as an immaterial soul.
claimThe author's philosophical arguments entail that many non-human beings possess an immaterial soul because many non-humans are conscious.
claimProperty dualism does not require the belief in an immaterial soul; it allows for the possibility that the subject of experiences is a brain or body that possesses both ordinary physical properties and irreducibly mental properties.
claimSubstance dualism is the philosophical claim that conscious beings are composed of two distinct substances: physical matter and an immaterial soul.
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 13, 2017 4 facts
claimThe fact that certain first-person thoughts are 'identification-free'—meaning they depend for their reference on no identification of oneself as a publicly presented object—contributes to the philosophical idea that these thoughts pick out a private object, such as a soul. This concept is connected to G.E.M. Anscombe's argument for the non-referential character of 'I'.
claimG.E.M. Anscombe argues that the first-person pronoun "I" cannot be understood as a proper name, a demonstrative, or an abbreviation of a definite description because each of these models requires a "conception" to reach its referent, and no such conception can be specified for "I" without either failing to guarantee reference or implying the existence of an immaterial soul.
claimG.E.M. Anscombe argues that "I" is not a referring expression because it does not function like a proper name, demonstrative, or definite description, and there is independent reason to believe immaterial souls do not exist.
claimLudwig Wittgenstein suggests that the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) is responsible for the mistaken opinion that the use of 'I' as a subject refers to an immaterial soul. Wittgenstein argues that self-ascriptions of psychological predicates do not rely on an identification of a bodily or non-bodily entity, but rather rely on no identification at all.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 3 facts
claimFor Humeans, the challenge of explaining the unity of the immaterial mind involves explaining the relationship between the different elements in the bundle that binds them into one thing.
claimExplaining the nature of the unity of the immaterial mind is a challenge for both those who believe the mind is a substance and those who believe it is a bundle of properties.
claimFor Cartesians, the challenge of explaining the unity of the immaterial mind involves explaining the notion of immaterial substance.
Self-Consciousness - Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science oecs.mit.edu Jul 24, 2024 1 fact
claimRené Descartes (1596–1650) concluded that his true self was an immaterial mind after finding a bedrock of certainty in his knowledge of his own mind and current thoughts.
Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Consciousness and the Intermediate ... frontiersin.org Apr 17, 2018 1 fact
perspectiveThe notion of embodiment self-contradicts its original intentions because it was taken into consideration to eliminate the immaterial mind, yet it relies on the body and its interaction with the world as a solution.