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epistemic peers
Also known as: epistemic peers, epistemic peer
Facts (11)
Sources
Social Epistemology – Introduction to Philosophy - Rebus Press press.rebus.community 6 facts
claimThe more likely it is that an individual and a disagreeing party are competent epistemic peers, the stronger the evidence provided by that disagreement that the individual's own view might be incorrect.
perspectiveThe steadfast view holds that sometimes, when one discovers that an epistemic peer disagrees, one is justified in retaining one's original doxastic attitude.
perspectiveThe conciliationist view holds that whenever one discovers that an epistemic peer disagrees about a proposition p, one is justified in conciliating, such as by decreasing one's confidence in p if the peer holds the opposite view with equal confidence.
claimOne objection to the skeptical argument regarding peer disagreement is that true epistemic peers—individuals who are known to be just as likely to be right as oneself—are rare, potentially limiting the scope of the skeptical conclusion.
claimConciliationism is the view that when epistemic peers disagree about a proposition, they should adopt an attitude closer to their peer's attitude than their initial attitude (Elga 2007).
claimEpistemic peers regarding a proposition p are defined as individuals who are equally likely to believe the truth about p, meaning they are equally unbiased, intelligent, sober, and well-informed.
Social Epistemology - Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science oecs.mit.edu Jul 24, 2024 5 facts
perspectiveConciliationists argue that when an epistemic peer disagrees with you, you are under a rational obligation to change your view, suspend judgment, or reopen the inquiry.
claimSome philosophers argue that the conditions for epistemic peerhood are so stringent that they are rarely met, and the fact that someone disagrees with you may be evidence that they are not your epistemic peer.
claimSome critics argue that the conditions for epistemic peerhood are so stringent that they are rarely met, and the mere fact of disagreement may serve as evidence that the other person is not an epistemic peer.
perspectiveConciliationists argue that norms of rationality require individuals to update their credence when presented with disconfirmatory evidence from an epistemic peer.
perspectiveAnti-conciliationists argue that individuals are not always under an epistemic obligation to revise their beliefs in light of disagreement with an epistemic peer.