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epistemic justification
Also known as: epistemically justified, epistemically justified beliefs
Facts (52)
Sources
Epistemic Justification – Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology press.rebus.community 24 facts
perspectiveCritics of virtue responsibilism argue that the theory focuses on moral or pragmatic justification rather than epistemic justification because beliefs derived from intellectually virtuous character traits do not necessarily need to be likely to be true or based in evidence.
claimEpistemic justification is distinct from other forms of justification, such as psychological or prudential justification, because it is specifically focused on aiming at or getting at the truth.
claimExplanationism is a theory of epistemic justification which posits that justification is determined by which propositions provide the best explanations for a person's experiences.
claimEpistemic justification is considered 'truth-conducive,' meaning that the presence of justification makes a belief likely to be true.
claimInternalists typically assert that epistemically justified beliefs are subjectively likely to be true, while externalists typically assert that epistemically justified beliefs are objectively likely to be true.
claimA belief based solely on wishful thinking, such as the hypothetical example of Kim believing her husband is unharmed in an accident simply because she wants it to be true, does not constitute knowledge because it lacks epistemic justification.
claimVirtue epistemology holds that epistemically justified beliefs are those resulting from intellectually virtuous character traits.
claimProper functionalism implies that epistemic justification is contingent on facts about the design of one's cognitive system, which are external to one's mind.
claimUnder the theory of proper functionalism, mental duplicates can differ in their level of epistemic justification, which is a feature of externalism.
claimUnderstanding epistemic justification can assist individuals in finding flaws in skeptical arguments, settling disagreements regarding which beliefs to hold in areas like religion, ethics, and politics, and determining what makes knowledge more valuable than true belief.
claimProper functionalism defines epistemic justification as a belief resulting from proper cognitive function, analogous to how a heart functions properly by pumping blood.
claimEpistemic justification comes in degrees.
claimExternalists in epistemology believe that the factors determining epistemic justification are settled by a combination of a person's mental states and factors outside the person's mind.
claimEpistemic justification functions as a knowledge-contributing link between a person and their belief that a proposition is true.
claimInternalism is the view that contributing factors to epistemic justification are entirely internal to a person’s mind.
claimInternalists in epistemology believe that the factors determining epistemic justification depend entirely on what is occurring inside a person's mind.
claimEpistemic justification is widely considered by epistemologists to be a necessary requirement for propositional knowledge.
claimHaving epistemic justification for a proposition provides a person with an entitlement, right, warrant, or good reason to believe that the proposition is true.
claimIn theories of epistemic justification, a 'defeater' is a condition that prevents the satisfaction of what would otherwise satisfy an epistemic theory's justification condition.
referenceJamie Carlin Watson authored the entry 'Epistemic Justification' for The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
claimEvidentialists typically agree that epistemic justification is truth-conducive, meaning that a person’s justified beliefs are probably true given the person’s overall evidence.
claimEpistemic justification makes a belief rational by providing reasons that count toward knowledge.
claimEvidentialists accept the view that epistemic justification is entirely a matter of a person's evidence, where evidence is defined as an indication of truth that can be used in thought.
claimExternalism is the view that epistemic justification is contingent on features of a person’s mind plus features external to a person’s mind.
Virtue Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 7 facts
referenceJames Montmarquet (1993) offers a virtue-based conception of epistemic justification that is aimed at illuminating moral responsibility rather than addressing the concerns that typically interest epistemologists.
claimErnest Sosa proposes a 'stratified' model of epistemic justification where primary justification is attached to intellectual virtues, such as sensory experience and memory, and secondary justification is attached to beliefs produced by those virtues.
claimIn his 1980 paper "The Raft and the Pyramid," Ernest Sosa argued that an appeal to intellectual virtue could resolve the conflict between foundationalists and coherentists regarding the structure of epistemic justification.
claimIn Ernest Sosa's stratified model of epistemic justification, a belief is considered justified if it originates from an intellectual virtue.
claimJames Montmarquet's view of epistemic justification fails to satisfy the second condition of virtue responsibilism.
perspectiveThe author of the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry argues that James Montmarquet's view of epistemic justification is problematic because it is possible to be justified without exercising virtuous intellectual character traits.
claimErnest Sosa's initial appeal to intellectual virtue in his essay “The Raft and the Pyramid” was intended to resolve the dispute between foundationalism and coherentism regarding the structure of epistemic justification.
Naturalistic Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 6 facts
claimAlvin Goldman's account of a priori knowledge is based on his reliabilist account of epistemic justification and the idea that a priori knowledge is based on processes of 'pure thought' that operate independently of experience or perception.
claimAlvin Goldman's approach to epistemic justification is reliabilist and grounded in science, asserting that justification is at least partly determined by beliefs being produced by reliable cognitive processes.
claimEpistemic justification is considered a positive property of beliefs because justified beliefs originate from reliable processes that promote the goal of believing what is true rather than what is false.
claimAlvin Goldman contends that humans consider processes like perception or deduction to confer justification because humans perceive these processes to be reliable.
perspectiveAlvin Goldman believes that assessments of problem-solving power and speed are only loosely connected to epistemic justification, if they are connected at all.
claimAlvin Goldman argues that it is necessary to construct a theory of what epistemic justification really is, distinct from how common sense perceives it, because commonsense assessments of belief-forming processes and their reliability often differ from the psychological truth.
Naturalized Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 5, 2001 4 facts
claimCausal and reliabilist accounts of epistemic justification are distinct from evidentialist accounts.
claimAccounts of epistemic justification based on epistemic duties, rights, or epistemically responsible behavior face similar naturalistic concerns as evidential support.
claimTraditional definitions of epistemic justification often rely on evaluative epistemic terms such as 'good reasons,' 'adequate evidence,' 'strong grounds,' or 'the right to be sure.'
claimEvidentialism defines epistemic justification as a state where a person is justified in believing a proposition at a specific time if and only if the evidence the person possesses at that time supports believing that proposition.
Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 3 facts
referenceChristopher R. Green published 'Suing One’s Sense Faculties for Fraud: ‘Justifiable Reliance’ in the Law as a Clue to Epistemic Justification' in Philosophical Papers 36:49-90 in 2007.
claimJames Van Cleve argues that children lack epistemic justification for their testimonially-based beliefs because they pass through a credulous phase where they believe nearly everything they are told without reason.
referencePeter Graham (2006) classifies epistemic positions as "reactionary," "conservative," "moderate," and "liberal" based on which principles of epistemic justification they accept or reject.
Virtue Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 9, 1999 2 facts
referenceThe book 'Knowledge, Truth and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility and Virtue', edited by Matthias Steup and published in 2001 by Oxford University Press, covers topics of epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue.
referenceErnest Sosa's conventional virtue epistemology (1991, 2003) attempts to define knowledge as true belief held out of intellectual virtue and seeks to settle the dispute between internalists and externalists regarding epistemic justification through detailed definitions and counterexamples.
Social Epistemology – Introduction to Philosophy - Rebus Press press.rebus.community 2 facts
Understanding epistemology and its key approaches in research cefcambodia.com Jan 21, 2023 2 facts
claimThe article 'Understanding epistemology and its key approaches in research' concludes that a high degree of epistemic justification is required for knowledge claims and for the conduct of research.
perspectiveLemos (2007) advocates that for a true belief to constitute knowledge, it must be epistemically justified, requiring a high degree of justification.
Virtue epistemology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimErnest Sosa argued that appealing to intellectual virtue could resolve the conflict between foundationalists and coherentists regarding the structure of epistemic justification.
Epistemology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
referenceJonathan L. Kvanvig authored the chapter 'Epistemic Justification' in 'The Routledge Companion to Epistemology', published by Routledge in 2011.