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dual-aspect monism
Also known as: Russellian monism, Dual-aspect monists, dual-aspect theory, dual aspect theory, Russellian panpsychism, neutral monism, dual-aspect metaphysics
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Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 43 facts
claimThe explanatory role of consciousness in dual-aspect monism can be described as causal, constitutive, or explanatory in a broader sense, as consciousness enables the existence of physical causes.
claimDual-aspect monism is also known as Russellian monism, named after Bertrand Russell, who defended many of its central claims in his works published in 1927 and 1948.
claimAccording to dual-aspect monism, physics describes reality from the outside by detailing relations between things, such as causal and spatiotemporal relations, but it does not describe the intrinsic properties of the things themselves.
claimDual-aspect monism, also known as Russellian monism, posits that reality consists of one kind of substance with two complementary aspects: the physical and the mental or protomental.
claimDual-aspect monists propose that consciousness might realize physical structure, or that the relations described by physics are relations between phenomenal experiences.
claimSubjective idealism differs from dual-aspect monism by asserting that the single substance possesses only mental properties throughout, and that physical properties are observer-dependent and not fully real.
claimDual-aspect monism posits that the physical and mental (or protomental) are two complementary aspects of a single underlying substance, where physical properties appear from a third-person, scientific perspective, and mental properties appear from a first-person, introspective perspective.
claimThe distinction between constitutive and emergent panpsychism is central to the 'combination problem,' which is a major objection to dual-aspect monism.
claimDual-aspect monism implies panpsychism (the view that consciousness is everywhere) or panprotopsychism (the view that protoconsciousness is everywhere), meaning even non-living entities like fundamental particles possess some fundamental form of consciousness or protoconsciousness.
claimIn the twentieth century, dual-aspect monism was maintained by philosophers including Grover Maxwell (1979), Timothy Sprigge (1983), Michael Lockwood (1989), Alfred North Whitehead (1929), and Charles Hartshorne (1937).
claimThe 'solving two problems at once' argument, which posits that dual-aspect monism avoids the problems of physicalism and dualism, is considered the most important argument for the dual-aspect monism view.
claimDual-aspect monism claims that reality consists of one fundamental kind of stuff that possesses both a physical aspect and a mental or protomental aspect.
claimThe combination problem is widely regarded as the most serious objection to dual-aspect monism.
claimHistorical proponents of dual-aspect monism or parts of the view include G. W. Leibniz and Arthur Schopenhauer.
claimDual-aspect monism argues that the narrow version of the principle of physical causal closure is false because purely physical causes would be purely structural entities, and structures cannot exist without being realized by something with intrinsic properties, analogous to how software cannot exist without hardware.
claimThe 'incredulous stare' is a common objection to dual-aspect monism, specifically the panpsychist version, which argues that it is implausible or counterintuitive to attribute consciousness to particles or simple, non-living entities.
claimDual-aspect monists may argue that causal powers are not mysterious because humans experience them in mental contexts, such as the experience of agency and motivation.
claimDual-aspect monism responds to the argument from previous explanatory successes by asserting that previously explained phenomena are functional or structural, whereas consciousness is not, preventing generalization from the former to the latter.
claimDual-aspect monism addresses the problem of physical causal closure by claiming that consciousness, as the realizer of physical structure, possesses an explanatory role compatible with physical causal closure, as argued by Stoljar (2001) and Chalmers (2003, 2013) and Alter and Nagasawa (2012).
claimDual-aspect monism argues that it is as parsimonious as physicalism in its response to the argument from mind–brain correlations, similar to the response provided by subjective idealism.
claimDual-aspect monists argue that phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are intrinsic.
perspectiveDual-aspect monists argue that consciousness and its phenomenal qualities are intrinsic because they are known in themselves, beyond their relations to causes, effects, or other things.
claimMonism is the philosophical view that there is only one kind of stuff or substance, and this category includes physicalism, subjective idealism, property dualism, and dual-aspect monism.
claimDual-aspect monism asserts that physics leaves a gap in the description of reality because it only describes the structure of reality, which consists of relations between things such as spatiotemporal, causal, mathematical, and logical relations.
perspectiveDual-aspect monists argue that a theory's coherence and support by good arguments are more important than whether the theory aligns with human intuition.
claimProperty dualism differs from dual-aspect monism by asserting that physical and mental properties are causally related or sharply distinct, rather than being complementary aspects, and typically posits that only some things possess mental properties.
claimDual-aspect monism is compatible with the epistemic gap because it regards consciousness as non-physical, similar to dualism.
claimDual-aspect monism asserts that there must be an entity that stands in the relations described by physics and possesses intrinsic or categorical properties.
claimDual-aspect monism faces the 'combination problem'.
claimPhysicalism differs from dual-aspect monism by asserting that the single substance possesses only physical properties throughout, with mental properties being constituted by physical properties.
claimThe recent resurgence of interest in dual-aspect monism is primarily driven by the argument that positing consciousness or protoconsciousness as the intrinsic nature of the physical offers the best explanation of how consciousness fits into the physical world, as noted by Alter and Nagasawa (2012) and Chalmers (2013).
perspectiveGalen Strawson endorses the dual-aspect monism version of panpsychism, which posits that fundamental physical entities are conscious or protoconscious because that is the intrinsic nature of their physical structure.
claimDual-aspect monists argue that positing unknown intrinsic properties is unnecessary when known properties like consciousness or protoconsciousness are available to perform the role of the intrinsic realizer of physical structure.
claimEpiphenomenalism, overdetermination dualism, and dual-aspect monism attempt to integrate with mainstream physics.
claimDual-aspect monists argue that physical properties are structural, relational, or dispositional, and that these structural properties have realizers with intrinsic or non-relational categorical properties.
claimDual-aspect monism avoids the problems of subjective idealism by treating the physical world as observer-independent and possessing the structure described by physics, thereby functioning as a form of realism about the physical world.
claimIn dual-aspect monism, the experiences of simple entities like particles are assumed to be extremely simple, comparable to the simplicity of their physical structure.
claimDual-aspect monism posits that everything, including particles, possesses both a physical and a (proto)mental aspect because (proto)consciousness is the intrinsic nature of physical properties, which physics describes only as structural or relational.
referenceDual-aspect monism can be defended based on the problem of explaining the intrinsic nature of the physical, as argued by Seager (2006) and Adams (2007).
claimExplaining mental combination leads to problems for dual-aspect monism that are strongly analogous to the problems faced by physicalism and dualism.
claimIn recent decades, dual-aspect monism has gained wider recognition as a distinct non-physicalist theory due to defenses by philosophers including David Chalmers (1995, 1996, 2003, 2013, 2016), William Seager (1995, 2010), Daniel Stoljar (2001), Galen Strawson (2006, 2016), and Philip Goff (2017).
claimDual-aspect monism is defined by the view that phenomenal properties are either fundamental or constituted by protophenomenal properties, and that physical properties are relations between or structures of these phenomenal or protophenomenal properties.
claimDual-aspect monism posits that the broad principle of physical causal closure is compatible with the theory because the principle does not specify whether causal relations or structures possess intrinsic realizers, such as phenomenal or protophenomenal ones.
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Nov 30, 2004 14 facts
claimHans Primas proposed a dual-aspect approach in 2003 and 2009 where the distinction between mental and material domains originates from the distinction between tensed (mental) time, which includes nowness, and tenseless (physical) time, which is viewed as an external parameter.
claimCarl Jung and Wolfgang Pauli (1955) suggested a dual-aspect theory of consciousness involving a psychophysically neutral, archetypal order.
referenceDual-aspect approaches to consciousness consider mental and material domains as manifestations of a single, underlying reality where mind and matter are unseparated, with the distinction between them arising from the tools used to gain epistemic access to these domains.
claimGiuseppe Vitiello's accounts suggest an inclination toward a dual-aspect approach regarding the relationship between brain states and mental states.
claimWolfgang Pauli and Carl Jung proposed a dual-aspect approach that draws a parallel between the epistemic/ontic distinction in material reality (quantum theory) and the epistemic/ontic distinction in mental domains.
claimDual-aspect approaches to consciousness face the problem of panpsychism or panexperientialism, where in the limit of universal symmetry breaking at a psychophysically neutral level, every system possesses both a mental and a material aspect.
claimQuantum-theoretically inspired variations of dual-aspect theory have been proposed by Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Jung, and by David Bohm and Basil Hiley, based on speculations that exceed the scope of contemporary quantum theory.
referenceIn the dual-aspect approach proposed by David Bohm and Basil Hiley, the notions of implicate and explicate order are used to mirror the distinction between ontic and epistemic domains.
claimIn dual-aspect theories, the term 'mentality' is defined more broadly than 'consciousness', encompassing unconscious or proto-mental acts alongside conscious mental acts.
claimThe 'dual aspect' theory posits that mental and material states are distinguished aspects of a psychophysically neutral 'background reality'.
claimThe dual-aspect conception of reality, which draws on the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, has been considered attractive by 20th-century scientists including Niels Bohr, Wolfgang Pauli, David Bohm, Hans Primas, and Bernard d'Espagnat.
claimHistorical proponents of dual aspect or psychophysically neutral views include Baruch Spinoza, Gustav Fechner (1861), Wilhelm Wundt (1911), and Alfred North Whitehead (1978).
claimMax Velmans (2002, 2009) presented a dual-aspect approach to consciousness backed by empirical material.
claimThe proposal by David Bohm and Basil Hiley regarding information-based dual-aspect approaches provides a conceptual framework but lacks detailed explanations concerning the mental domain.
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Nov 30, 2004 10 facts
claimBaruch Spinoza is considered the earliest explicit protagonist of dual-aspect thinking in occidental philosophy.
claimIn the dual-aspect monism framework, mental and material manifestations may inherit mutual correlations because they are jointly caused by psychophysically neutral archetypes.
claimHans Primas proposed a dual-aspect approach to the mind-matter problem based on the distinction between tensed (mental) time, which includes nowness, and tenseless (physical) time, which is viewed as an external parameter.
claimGalen Strawson (2003) proposed a 'real materialism' that utilizes a scheme closely related to dual-aspect thinking.
claimDual-aspect thinking is divided into two basic classes: compositional approaches, where mental and physical properties are reducible to psychophysically neutral elements, and decompositional approaches, where the mental and physical emerge from a holistic neutral domain by breaking symmetry.
claimJohn Wheeler’s concept of observer-participancy, which includes a mind-matter link, can be interpreted as a special case of the correlations found in dual-aspect monism.
claimDual-aspect monism posits that mind-matter correlations reflect the lost holism of the underlying reality rather than resulting from direct causal interaction between mental and material domains.
perspectiveDual-aspect monism is the only philosophical position that explains mind-matter correlations in a natural way rather than simply positing them, though it is not suitable for explaining direct efficient mental causation.
claimPanpsychism (or panexperientialism) differs from dual-aspect monism because it lacks a psychophysically neutral domain of reality and instead posits a dualistic approach where mental and physical domains are primordially coupled.
claimDavid Chalmers (1996) proposed that the underlying, psychophysically neutral level of description in dual-aspect theory could be characterized in terms of information.
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Nov 30, 2004 5 facts
claimAtmanspacher and Fach (2013) proposed a typology of mind-matter correlations based on Pauli and Jung's dual-aspect monism.
claimMax Velmans (2002, 2009) developed a dual aspect approach supported by empirical material from psychology.
claimA key distinction between the two primary classes of dual-aspect thinking is how the psychophysically neutral domain relates to the mental and physical domains.
claimThe approach to consciousness proposed by Henry Stapp contains elements of dual-aspect thinking, although this is not heavily emphasized by the author.
claimThe Pauli-Jung conjecture, as discussed by Atmanspacher and Fuchs in 2014, proposes a dual-aspect monism framework to explain mind-matter correlations.
Critique of Panpsychism: Philosophical Coherence and Scientific ... thequran.love May 7, 2025 4 facts
claimBaruch Spinoza (1632–1677) advanced a form of dual-aspect monism, holding that there is only one substance—identified with God or Nature—which possesses infinite attributes, of which mind (thought) and matter (extension) are the two accessible to humans.
referenceBaruch Spinoza's dual-aspect monism, as presented in his 1677 work 'Ethics', is interpreted by some as panpsychist, asserting that all things are animate in various degrees.
claimDual-aspect monism, also known as neutral monism or Russellian panpsychism, posits that matter has two aspects: a quantitative, scientific aspect from the outside, and a conscious aspect from the inside.
perspectiveMost contemporary panpsychists affirm a mind-independent world that is permeated with mind-like qualities, aligning them with dual-aspect monism rather than full-blown idealism.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 3 facts
referenceDefenders of dual aspect theory, such as Baruch Spinoza (1677/2005), P. Strawson (1959), and Thomas Nagel (1986), argue that the hard problem of consciousness necessitates a rethinking of basic ontology without necessarily entailing dualism.
claimDual-aspect, neutral monist, and panpsychic accounts of consciousness hold that the connection between the physical brain and phenomenal consciousness is one of brute constitution, where physical and phenomenal properties constantly co-occur while remaining metaphysically distinct.
claimDual aspect theory, neutral monism, and panpsychism hold that phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to basic physical properties, but may reduce to a more basic substance that possesses both physical and phenomenal properties.
Panpsychism - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 3 facts
perspectivePhilip Goff believes that neutral monism can reasonably be regarded as a form of panpsychism in so far as it is a dual aspect view.
claimIn versions of neutral monism where the fundamental constituents are both mental and physical, the philosophy may lead to panpsychism, panprotopsychism, or dual aspect theory.
claimNeutral monism, panpsychism, and dual aspect theory are grouped together or used interchangeably in some contexts.
PANPSYCHISM (Philosophy of Mind Series) - Amazon.com amazon.com 2 facts
perspectiveThe author argues that Galen Strawson's terminology regarding physicalism is confusing because his definition allows for a person to be a 'physicalist' while simultaneously holding views such as neutral monism, dual-aspect monism, dualism, or idealism.
perspectiveThe reviewer argues that panpsychism is not limited to physicalism but can be integrated into any metaphysical system, including neutral monism, dual-aspect monism, dualism, and idealism.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
claimOntological models are often categorized as 'monism' (including neutral monism, dual aspect monism, type-F monism, and Russell's monism) or 'dualism' (including aspect-dualism and naturalistic dualism) based on how they interpret properties as aspects or emergent ontic categories.
(DOC) The hard problem of consciousness & the phenomenological ... academia.edu 1 fact
claimPhilosophical theories regarding the gap between qualia and concepts include interactive dualism (associated with René Descartes), mono aspect monism, and dual aspect monism.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 1 fact
claimGustav Fechner extended his panpsychism to all of nature in his 1851 work 'Zend-Avista', aligning with his dual-aspect metaphysics.