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conscious states
Also known as: conscious state, conscious mental states
Facts (93)
Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 22 facts
claimPhysicalists, including Smart (1959), Hill (1991), Block and Stalnaker (1999), McLaughlin (2001), and Melnyk (2003), argue that the best explanation for mind-brain supervenience is that conscious states are constituted by the brain states they supervene on.
claimIn overdetermination dualism, physical behavior is caused by both a conscious state and a brain state, where each cause is sufficient on its own to produce the effect.
claimNeuroscience can discover correlations between phenomenal states and conscious states, such as the correlation between the feeling of depression and low serotonin levels, or seeing the color red and activity in the visual cortex.
claimWilliam James questioned why specific conscious states, such as pain and pleasure, evolved as by-products of specific physical states rather than others, such as why pain evolved with harmful processes like burning and pleasure with beneficial processes like eating.
referenceThe Global Workspace Theory posits that physical correlates of conscious states are connected to a global neuronal workspace.
claimConscious states are characterized by subjectivity and particular qualities known as qualia or phenomenal qualities.
claimPhysicalists use the 'argument from mind–brain correlations' to suggest that conscious states are constituted by their correlated physical brain states.
perspectiveMost philosophers find overdetermination dualism implausible because it is inexplicable why conscious states would systematically and without exception cause the exact same effects as the physical states they are correlated with, as there is no reason to expect psychophysical laws to mirror physical laws in this way.
claimThe explanatory argument posits that one cannot simply assume that conscious states are constituted by physical states; it must be demonstrated that they are.
claimEpiphenomenalism can explain fitting correlations between conscious states and physical behavior by positing one-way psychophysical laws where pain is a by-product of avoidance-causing physical states and pleasure is a by-product of attraction-causing physical states.
claimBrain scanning techniques such as PET and fMRI have revealed detailed correlations between specific conscious states and brain states, such as the correlation between seeing red and activity in the visual cortex, or anxiety and an overactive amygdala.
claimThe argument for physicalism states that if the principle of physical causal closure is correct, then epiphenomenalism and overdetermination are unacceptable, and conscious states must be physical to cause physical behavior without overdetermination.
claimOverdetermination dualism posits that psychophysical laws operate in both directions: physical states produce conscious states, and conscious states produce physical effects such as behavior.
claimC.D. Broad and Frank Jackson argued that conscious states could evolve as by-products of useful brain states, even if those conscious states themselves are inert.
claimChalmers and McQueen propose that conscious states cause the collapse of physical states in the brain, and these states do not necessarily have to be measurements.
claimHuman behavior can be explained physically without referencing conscious states like the feeling of pain or the intention to move.
claimInteractionism must posit specific two-way psychophysical laws where pain causes avoidance and pleasure causes pursuit to explain fitting correlations between conscious states and physical behavior.
referenceIdentity theory posits that conscious states are constituted by specific physical states or processes, such as the feeling of pain being constituted by c-fibers firing, seeing red by neural activity in the visual cortex, or the feeling of love by neural activity involving serotonin and oxytocin.
referenceFunctionalism defines conscious states as functional states, which are determined by their causes and effects on behavior, internal states, or other functional states, and are realized by physical states or processes.
claimPhysicalism must posit specific psychophysical constitution relations where pain is constituted by avoidance-causing physical states and pleasure is constituted by attraction-causing physical states to explain fitting correlations between conscious states and physical behavior.
claimPhysicalism is supported by the observation that conscious states depend entirely on brain states, as indicated by neuroscience.
claimSubjective idealism explains mind-brain correlations by regarding brain states as perceptions of one subject (a person observing someone else's brain) and conscious states as the perceptions or other conscious states of another subject (the person whose brain is being observed).
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Jun 18, 2004 15 facts
claimQualitative states are defined as conscious states that involve qualitative or experiential properties, often referred to as 'qualia' or 'raw sensory feels'.
claimThe concept of a conscious organism depends upon the specific account of conscious states provided, as noted in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on consciousness.
claimConscious states might be distinguished from nonconscious states by their intra-mental dynamics and interactions, such as a richer stock of content-sensitive interactions or a greater degree of flexible purposive guidance associated with self-conscious control of thought.
claimConscious systems and conscious mental states involve diverse forms of unity, including causal unities related to the integration of action and control into a unified focus of agency, and representational or intentional unities involving the integration of diverse content at various scales.
claimRepresentationalism functions as a qualified form of eliminativism because it denies the existence of mental properties that are not representational, such as qualia understood as intrinsic monadic properties of conscious states.
claimPerception of wine taste or the color of fabric are considered conscious mental states because they involve sensory qualia.
perspectiveAnti-representationalists argue that the logical possibility of inverted qualia demonstrates that conscious states can differ in significant mental respects while remaining representationally identical.
claimFranz Brentano proposed in 1874 that conscious states involve double intentionality, where a single state is simultaneously directed at an external object and at itself.
perspectiveSome philosophers regard consciousness as a component or aspect of reality that manifests in conscious states and creatures, though this strongly realist view is not currently common.
referenceGlobal Workspace theories, Prinz's Attended Intermediate Representation (AIR) (Prinz 2012), and Tononi's Integrated Information Theory (IIT) distinguish conscious states and processes partly by enhanced widespread access to the state's content.
claimHorgan and Tienson (2002) use "brain in the vat" intuitions to support the view that conscious mental states possess intrinsic intentional content, even if the brain lacks causal and informational links to the external world.
claimRepresentationalist theory posits that if two conscious or experiential states share all their representational properties, they will not differ in any mental respect.
perspectiveJohn Searle (1990) holds the perspective that only conscious states and dispositions to have conscious states can be genuinely intentional, a view that contrasts with the majority of theorists who regard intentionality as extending into the unconscious domain.
claimConscious mental states are typically regarded as having a representational or intentional aspect, meaning they are about things, refer to things, or have satisfaction conditions.
claimBaars (1988) posits that information carried in conscious mental states is typically available for use by a diversity of mental subsystems and for application to a wide range of potential situations and actions.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 13 facts
claimHigher-order representationalists argue that the difference between conscious and nonconscious mental states is that subjects are appropriately aware of their conscious states, while they remain unaware of their nonconscious states.
claimThe 'immediacy' of the subjective component of consciousness refers to the way subjects access conscious states from a first-person perspective without inference, evidence, or argument.
claimThe immediacy of the subjective component of consciousness creates an intuition of special accuracy or infallibility regarding knowledge of one's own conscious states, which contributes to the hard problem of consciousness.
claimDaniel Dennett argues that if a mental state is available to the mind via the 'global workspace,' it is a conscious state.
claimUriah Kriegel defines the 'subjective component of consciousness' as the feature where subjects are aware of their conscious states in a distinctive way, focusing on the fact that something appears for the organism.
claimThomas Nagel argues that conscious mental states are inherently subjective and can only be fully grasped from limited viewpoints, whereas scientific explanation requires an objective characterization that moves away from any particular point of view.
claimConscious states are standardly understood as states where there is something it is like for the organism to be in them.
referenceFirst-order representationalism contends that conscious states make humans aware of things in the world by representing them in the appropriate way.
claimEpiphenomenalism conflicts with the common intuition that conscious states, such as pain, directly cause behaviors like screaming or cringing.
claimThomas Nagel asserts that the inherent subjectivity of conscious states makes the mind-body problem intractable for science.
claimEpiphenomenalists may propose that first-person knowledge of conscious states is achieved through a unique kind of noncausal acquaintance, or that having the phenomenal state itself constitutes the knowledge of that state.
claimEpiphenomenalists argue that knowledge of one's own conscious states is not caused by the phenomenal qualities of those experiences, rejecting the commonsense view that the feeling of pain causes the knowledge of that pain.
referenceThe 'global workspace' hypothesis holds that conscious states are mental states available for processing by a wide range of cognitive systems by being present in a special network called the 'global workspace.'
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 13, 2017 7 facts
referenceHigher-order theories of consciousness maintain that a psychological state is conscious if and only if it is represented in the right way by a higher-order state.
claimDavid Chalmers (1996) argues that higher-order theories of consciousness lead to an unnecessarily 'cluttered picture of the mind' by postulating a distinct higher-order state for every conscious state.
referenceHigher-Order Perception (HOP) theories of consciousness maintain that the higher-order state representing a conscious state is a perception-like sensory state, often described as an exercise of 'inner sense'.
claimUriah Kriegel argues that consciousness entails intransitive self-consciousness because conscious states not only represent themselves but also implicitly represent the subject as having them.
claimFred Dretske (1995) and Michael Tye (1995) question whether higher-order theories of consciousness can adequately account for the conscious states of infants and non-human animals.
claimPhenomena such as thought insertion, anarchic hand, alien limb, anonymous memory, and anonymous vision involve subjects who are aware of their own conscious states, actions, or body parts, but without being aware of them as their own.
claimSome philosophers argue that it is impossible to rationally doubt that one is the subject of one's own current conscious states, which involves an 'introspective demonstrative' picking out those states.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 4 facts
claimSome versions of panpsychism distinguish between conscious and unconscious mental states, asserting the ubiquity of the mental while denying that consciousness is similarly widespread.
claimGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz argued that conscious mental states represent only an infinitesimal fraction of the life of a mind, with the majority composed of consciously imperceptible 'petites perceptions'.
claimPanpsychism faces a potential problem of emergence if it ascribes only unconscious mental properties to fundamental entities, as this necessitates an explanation for how conscious mental states arise.
claimMany panpsychists utilize the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states when formulating their doctrines.
Global Versus Local Theories of Consciousness and the ... link.springer.com 3 facts
claimIntegrated Information Theory (IIT) classifies the concept of conscious states as integrated networks of structures, known as complexes, as a type of globalist account.
claimThe axiom of composition in Integrated Information Theory posits that all conscious states are structured and composed of several features, which occur after binding, whereas Semir Zeki's theory of microconsciousness suggests that conscious states occur at an earlier stage.
claimThe axiom of exclusion in Integrated Information Theory states that one conscious state excludes others, meaning that if several complexes co-exist in a system, only the complex maximizing the value of Φ (labelled Φmax) will be conscious.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 3 facts
claimDavid Chalmers suggests that just as Newton's theory of gravitation explains why an apple falls by invoking a fundamental force rather than just correlating drop heights and times, a theory of consciousness should explain why brain states produce conscious states by invoking fundamental laws.
claimDavid Chalmers defines 'nonreductive functionalism' as a position where functional states determine conscious states with natural but not logical necessity, avoiding a logical connection between function and experience.
claimDavid Chalmers posits that the concept of information may provide a framework for progress in consciousness studies because it captures a formal isomorphism between conscious states and underlying physical states.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 3 facts
claimJoseph Levine proposes a thought experiment involving an alien species that lacks c-fibers to demonstrate that the absence of a specific physical state (c-fiber firing) does not logically entail the absence of a conscious state (pain), leaving the question of whether the aliens feel pain open.
claimJoseph Levine uses the example of pain and its reduction to the firing of c-fibers to illustrate the difficulty of mapping conscious states to physical states, noting that in other scientific fields like chemistry and physics, connections between levels of description are necessary rather than contingent.
claimJoseph Levine disputes that conscious states are reducible to neuronal or brain states, arguing that the bridges between conscious states and physical states are contingent rather than necessary.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 2 facts
claimA fundamental distinction in the philosophy of mind is between conscious and unconscious mental states, leading to debates about whether panpsychism asserts that consciousness is universal or that a form of unconscious mentality, often called proto-mentality, exists throughout the universe.
claimGeorge Berkeley viewed material objects as constructions of conscious states rather than indicators of how minds are distributed.
the explanatory power behind the non-physicalist paradigm - Frontiers frontiersin.org 4 days ago 2 facts
claimThe explanatory power of a Theory of Consciousness (TOC) is defined as the degree to which the theory makes it intelligible why conscious states are formed under specific conditions.
claimThe predictive power of a Theory of Consciousness (TOC) is defined as the accuracy with which the theory states the conditions under which a physical system is capable of forming conscious states.
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Nov 30, 2004 2 facts
claimHans Flohr (2000) proposes that the specific plasticity of NMDA receptors is a necessary condition for the formation of extended stable neuronal assemblies, which he identifies with conscious states.
claimIn Carl Jung's depth psychology, the conscious and unconscious mental domains are connected by the process of emergence, where conscious mental states emerge from the unconscious, a process analogous to physical measurement.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 Edition) plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 2 facts
claimRussellian monism posits that conscious states are the intrinsic nature of brain states, which implies that the causal actions of brain states and conscious states are identical.
claimMørch is a leading advocate of the 'phenomenal powers view', which posits that conscious states necessitate their effects in virtue of how those states feel.
Dualism, Physicalism, and Philosophy of Mind - Capturing Christianity capturingchristianity.com Dec 11, 2019 2 facts
Theories and Methods of Consciousness biomedres.us Jan 29, 2024 1 fact
claimNeural correlates of consciousness (NCC) are defined as the minimal neural mechanisms of the conscious state.
In defense of scientifically and philosophically (not politically ... blog.apaonline.org Nov 14, 2023 1 fact
claimWhile neural correlates of content-specific conscious states, such as seeing a face, are easier to identify, the 'full NCC' remains unverified in terms of its brain location and neuroanatomy.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 1 fact
claimThe zombie hypothesis claims that it is imaginable and possible for a body to exist without any associated conscious states, which would show that conscious states are something over and above physical states.
Ancient Roots of Today's Emerging Renaissance in ... link.springer.com 1 fact
referenceRobin L. Carhart-Harris, Robert Leech, Peter Hellyer, Murray Shanahan, Amanda Feilding, Enzo Tagliazucci, Dante R. Chialvo, and David Nutt proposed 'The Entropic Brain' theory, which uses neuroimaging research with psychedelic drugs to explain conscious states.
David Chalmers Thinks the Hard Problem Is Really Hard scientificamerican.com Apr 10, 2017 1 fact
claimA 'consciousness-meter' would provide the data necessary to formulate a semi-mathematical theory of consciousness by correlating physical systems with conscious states.
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Nov 30, 2004 1 fact
claimA mental system can exist in various conscious, intentional, and phenomenal states, where a sequence of these states in a hypothetical state space forms a trajectory known as the stream of consciousness.
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence? A Framework for Classifying ... arxiv.org Nov 20, 2025 1 fact
perspectiveMachine learning researchers argue that computational neural dynamics and trajectories, construed as attractor dynamics reflecting oscillatory dynamics with harmonic modes, can explain the ineffability and richness of conscious states.
The function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspective frontiersin.org Nov 25, 2024 1 fact
claimThe brain's gatekeeper function controls the contents of each fully realized conscious state through selective attention.
Non-Reductive Physicalism - Theories of Consciousness theoriesofconsciousness.com 1 fact
claimGeorg Northoff's research indicates that conscious states correlate with specific spatiotemporal patterns in neural activity, these patterns cannot be reduced to activity in specific brain regions, and the brain's intrinsic activity creates a 'temporal window' that enables conscious experience.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 18, 2017 1 fact
claimRussellian monism attempts to avoid the problems of dualism and physicalism by suggesting that conscious states are the intrinsic nature of brain states, meaning the causal action of brain states and conscious states are the same.
The evolution of human-type consciousness – a by-product of ... frontiersin.org 1 fact
claimAlterations of conscious states, such as hypnosis and placebo, can modify and improve the functioning of systems ranging from internal secretion and immune systems to motor, sensory, emotional, and intellectual capacities.
Psychedelics, Sociality, and Human Evolution frontiersin.org 1 fact
referenceCarhart-Harris et al. (2014) proposed 'The entropic brain' theory, which models conscious states using neuroimaging research on psychedelic drugs.
[PDF] A Consensus Taxonomy of Altered (Nonordinary) States of ... behavior-of-organisms.org 1 fact
referenceThe article titled 'A theory of conscious states informed by neuroimaging research with psychedelic drugs' is published in the journal Frontiers in Human Neuroscience as Volume 8, Article 20.