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cross_type 0.90 — strongly supporting 9 facts
David Chalmers is the philosopher who developed the classification system that defines and categorizes type-A materialism {fact:5, fact:6}. He frequently analyzes and critiques this position, identifying its proponents {fact:1, fact:9} and arguing that it denies the manifest reality of the hard problem of consciousness {fact:3, fact:4, fact:8}.
Facts (9)
Sources
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 8 facts
referenceDavid Chalmers notes that sophisticated arguments for type-A materialism exist in philosophical literature, specifically citing works by Sydney Shoemaker (1975) and Stephen White (1986).
claimDavid Chalmers identifies the primary divide in the field of consciousness studies as being between those who believe there is a phenomenon that needs explaining (the rest) and those who believe there is not (type-A materialists).
claimType-A materialists deny that there is a problem of consciousness distinct from the problem of explaining functions, a position David Chalmers argues lacks strong supporting evidence.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers characterizes type-A materialism as an extremely counterintuitive position that appears to deny a manifest fact about human experience.
claimDavid Chalmers categorizes materialist responses to the 'hard problem' of consciousness into two types: type-A materialism, which denies the existence of a hard problem distinct from easy problems, and type-B materialism, which accepts the existence of a distinct problem but argues it can be accommodated within a materialist framework.
claimDavid Chalmers states that for a type-A materialist to resolve the hard problem of consciousness, they must argue that explaining the functions of consciousness is equivalent to explaining everything about it.
claimDavid Chalmers states that phenomenology is largely neutral on ontological debates, with the possible exception of rejecting type-A materialism.
claimDavid Chalmers classifies Patricia Churchland as a 'type-A materialist' because she suggests there is no principled difference between the 'hard' and 'easy' problems of consciousness.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers' 2002 classification system, which distinguishes between type-A/B/C/Q materialisms, type-D/E dualisms, and type-F monism, has become a standard reference in the philosophy of mind.