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Type-A materialism
Also known as: type-A materialist, Type-A materialists
Facts (22)
Sources
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 14 facts
claimType-A materialism encompasses philosophical positions such as eliminativism, behaviorism, and analytic functionalism.
claimThe facts about consciousness do not follow from the facts about the structure and functioning of neural processes, provided that type-A materialism is rejected.
referenceDavid Chalmers notes that sophisticated arguments for type-A materialism exist in philosophical literature, specifically citing works by Sydney Shoemaker (1975) and Stephen White (1986).
claimDavid Chalmers identifies the primary divide in the field of consciousness studies as being between those who believe there is a phenomenon that needs explaining (the rest) and those who believe there is not (type-A materialists).
claimType-A materialism is sometimes expressed by denying the existence of consciousness, or by defining consciousness as a functional capacity such as 'reportability'.
claimType-A materialists deny that there is a problem of consciousness distinct from the problem of explaining functions, a position David Chalmers argues lacks strong supporting evidence.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers characterizes type-A materialism as an extremely counterintuitive position that appears to deny a manifest fact about human experience.
claimType-A materialism asserts that for consciousness, structure and function are the only aspects that need to be explained.
claimType-A materialism asserts that once all functional aspects of a system are explained, there is nothing else to explain regarding consciousness, denying that there is any conceptually distinct explanatory target.
claimDavid Chalmers categorizes materialist responses to the 'hard problem' of consciousness into two types: type-A materialism, which denies the existence of a hard problem distinct from easy problems, and type-B materialism, which accepts the existence of a distinct problem but argues it can be accommodated within a materialist framework.
claimType-A materialists often attempt to deflate the "hard problem" of consciousness by using analogies to other domains where such problems are considered misguided.
claimDavid Chalmers states that for a type-A materialist to resolve the hard problem of consciousness, they must argue that explaining the functions of consciousness is equivalent to explaining everything about it.
claimDavid Chalmers states that phenomenology is largely neutral on ontological debates, with the possible exception of rejecting type-A materialism.
claimDavid Chalmers classifies Patricia Churchland as a 'type-A materialist' because she suggests there is no principled difference between the 'hard' and 'easy' problems of consciousness.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 6 facts
referenceRoberto Horácio Sá Pereira published 'In Defence of Type-A Materialism' in the journal Diametros.
claimType-A materialism, also known as reductive materialism or a priori physicalism, is a philosophical view committed to physicalism that rejects the hard problem of consciousness by asserting that it either does not exist or is merely an easy problem.
claimType-A materialism posits that every fact about the mind is a fact about the performance of functions or behaviors, meaning there are no facts left over in need of explanation once those functions are accounted for.
claimType-A materialists who reject the existence of phenomenal consciousness entirely hold a view known as eliminative materialism or illusionism.
claimThinkers who subscribe to type-A materialism include Paul Churchland, Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Keith Frankish, and Thomas Metzinger.
claimType-A materialists who believe in the reality of phenomenal consciousness but argue it is not an addition to certain functions or behaviors hold a view known as strong reductionism.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Jun 18, 2004 1 fact
referenceC. Hill published 'Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism' through Cambridge University Press in 1991.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers' 2002 classification system, which distinguishes between type-A/B/C/Q materialisms, type-D/E dualisms, and type-F monism, has become a standard reference in the philosophy of mind.