Relations (1)
related 2.00 — strongly supporting 3 facts
Qualia are central to the debate surrounding eliminativism, as modest eliminativists like Dennett and Carruthers challenge their existence [1], while Frankish advocates for a thoroughgoing eliminativist stance against them [2]. Furthermore, representationalism is considered a form of eliminativism precisely because it rejects the existence of qualia as non-representational mental properties [3].
Facts (3)
Sources
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu 2 facts
perspectiveModest eliminativists, such as Dennett (1990, 1992) and Carruthers (2000), do not reject the notion of consciousness entirely but take issue with specific features like qualia, the conscious self, or the 'Cartesian Theater' where the temporal sequence of conscious experience is internally projected.
claimRepresentationalism functions as a qualified form of eliminativism because it denies the existence of mental properties that are not representational, such as qualia understood as intrinsic monadic properties of conscious states.
Research - Keith Frankish keithfrankish.com 1 fact
perspectiveKeith Frankish argues that materialists should be thoroughgoing eliminativists about qualia, questioning the coherence of the weak conception of qualia typically employed by materialists.