concept

eliminativism

Also known as: eliminativist perspective, Eliminativists, eliminativist

Facts (16)

Sources
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Wikipedia 5 facts
perspectiveKeith Frankish argues that illusionism is preferable to eliminativism as a label for the view that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion, and that illusionism is preferable to realism about phenomenal consciousness.
claimChristof Koch, a neuroscientist and proponent of Integrated Information Theory, describes eliminativism as the "metaphysical counterpart to Cotard's syndrome, a psychiatric condition in which patients deny being alive."
measurementAccording to the 2020 PhilPapers survey, 4.51% of philosophers surveyed subscribe to eliminativism.
perspectiveChristof Koch asserts that the prevalence of eliminativism serves as evidence that "much of twentieth-century analytic philosophy has gone to the dogs".
referenceDaniel Dennett argues for an eliminativist perspective on consciousness in his 1991 book 'Consciousness Explained', suggesting that consciousness is not what it seems.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 4 facts
referenceEliminativism regarding consciousness is defended by Rey (1997), Dennett (1978, 1988), Wilkes (1984), and Ryle (1949).
claimEliminativism is a response to the hard problem of consciousness that asserts there is no hard problem because consciousness does not exist.
claimEliminativist views in philosophy of mind resist the idea that human experience is equivalent to consciousness, specifically in the phenomenal or 'what it's like' sense.
claimEliminativists argue that consciousness, when defined as a non-functional or non-relational phenomenon, is a philosopher's construction that can be rejected without absurdity.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Jun 18, 2004 2 facts
perspectiveModest eliminativists, such as Dennett (1990, 1992) and Carruthers (2000), do not reject the notion of consciousness entirely but take issue with specific features like qualia, the conscious self, or the 'Cartesian Theater' where the temporal sequence of conscious experience is internally projected.
claimRepresentationalism functions as a qualified form of eliminativism because it denies the existence of mental properties that are not representational, such as qualia understood as intrinsic monadic properties of conscious states.
Research - Keith Frankish keithfrankish.com Keith Frankish 2 facts
perspectiveKeith Frankish argues that materialists should be thoroughgoing eliminativists about qualia, questioning the coherence of the weak conception of qualia typically employed by materialists.
claimKeith Frankish argues that the threat of eliminativism about belief diminishes once different levels of belief are distinguished.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 fact
claimType-A materialism encompasses philosophical positions such as eliminativism, behaviorism, and analytic functionalism.
Critique of Panpsychism: Philosophical Coherence and Scientific ... thequran.love Zia H Shah MD · The Muslim Times May 7, 2025 1 fact
claimPanpsychism claims to avoid the eliminativist or epiphenomenalist tendencies of hardline physicalism by refusing to treat consciousness as an illusion or a byproduct with no causal power.
Consciousness and Cognitive Sciences journal-psychoanalysis.eu Journal of Psychoanalysis 1 fact
claimThe authors of 'Consciousness and Cognitive Sciences' identify the work of P. Churchland & Sejnowski (1992) and F. Crick & Ch. Koch (1990) as representing the 'neuroreductionism' or 'eliminativism' position within naturalistic approaches to cognitive science.