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David Chalmers and Daniel Dennett are prominent philosophers of mind whose relationship is defined by their fundamental disagreement over the nature of consciousness, specifically regarding Chalmers' 'hard problem' versus Dennett's functionalist 'no problem' perspective [1], [2], [3]. Their intellectual rivalry is characterized by Chalmers' critiques of Dennett's third-person absolutism and heterophenomenology [2], [4], and Dennett's dismissal of Chalmers' philosophical zombies as an embarrassment [5].
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Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 13 facts
claimDavid Chalmers attributes to Daniel Dennett the view that consciousness is defined solely as reportability, reactive disposition, or other functional concepts.
referenceIn his book 'Consciousness Explained', Daniel Dennett relies on 'heterophenomenology'—the use of verbal reports as the central source of data—which David Chalmers critiques for implicitly assuming that verbal reports are the only aspect of consciousness requiring explanation.
claimDavid Chalmers contends that the 'no problem' view of consciousness is rooted in unargued philosophical axioms, such as Daniel Dennett's third-person absolutism, rather than empirical evidence or non-circular arguments.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers asserts that the view that one can reject Daniel Dennett's 'no problem' perspective on consciousness while still expecting a purely physical explanation is untenable for systematic reasons.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that the 'hard problem' of consciousness is about explaining the view from the first-person perspective, whereas Daniel Dennett's 'third-person absolutism' focuses on reactions and abilities viewed from the outside.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that even if Daniel Dennett could demonstrate that function is required for experience, this does not prove that function is the only aspect of experience that requires explanation.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that Daniel Dennett's reductive accounts of phenomena like 'cuteness' and 'perception' fail to support reductionism about experience because they either lack plausibility or rely on experiential properties that reductive accounts omit.
claimDavid Chalmers asserts that his disagreement with Daniel Dennett regarding consciousness stems from basic intuitions about first-person phenomenology.
claimDavid Chalmers interprets Daniel Dennett's 'Orwell/Stalin' discussion as an argument that takes materialism as a premise to conclude that functional facts exhaust all facts about consciousness.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that Daniel Dennett's list of phenomena requiring explanation is systematically incomplete because it omits the experience of emotion and the phenomenal visual field.
claimDavid Chalmers disputes Daniel Dennett's classification of phenomena like 'feelings of foreboding', 'fantasies', and 'delight and dismay' as purely functional matters.
claimDavid Chalmers notes that if Colin McGinn's view asserts that explaining experience is just a problem of explaining structure and function, it becomes remarkably similar to Daniel Dennett's position.
accountThe symposium on David Chalmers' paper 'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness' included 26 commentaries from various scholars, including Bernard Baars, Douglas Bilodeau, Patricia Churchland, Tom Clark, C.J.S. Clarke, Francis Crick, Christof Koch, Daniel Dennett, Stuart Hameroff, Roger Penrose, Valerie Hardcastle, David Hodgson, Piet Hut, Roger Shepard, Benjamin Libet, E.J. Lowe, Bruce MacLennan, Colin McGinn, Eugene Mills, Kieron O'Hara, Tom Scutt, Mark Price, William Robinson, Gregg Rosenberg, William Seager, Jonathan Shear, Henry Stapp, Francisco Varela, Max Velmans, and Richard Warner.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
perspectiveDaniel Dennett argues that the 'hard problem' of consciousness will be solved as a byproduct of solving the 'easy problems' defined by David Chalmers.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimScientific and philosophical research into the nature and basis of consciousness experienced a major resurgence in the 1980s and 1990s, involving researchers such as Bernard Baars (1988), Daniel Dennett (1991), Roger Penrose (1989, 1994), Francis Crick (1994), William Lycan (1987, 1996), and David Chalmers (1996).
The Conscious Mind - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
perspectiveDaniel Dennett labeled David Chalmers a 'reactionary' and described the invocation of philosophical zombies as 'an embarrassment,' arguing that the thought experiment relies on a 'hunch' and begs the question.