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Nikolaus von Stillfried critically analyzes and critiques David Chalmers's philosophy of consciousness, including his transition from epistemological to ontological gaps [1], reluctance on direct phenomenal judgments against epiphenomenalism [2], failure to distinguish phenomenal experiencing from irreducible categories [3], implicit presumptions [4], and circular definition of consciousness [5], while noting that Chalmers's acquaintance concept addresses epistemology but not ontology [6].
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The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 6 facts
claimVon Stillfried concludes that there are valid reasons for David Chalmers's transition from an epistemological gap to an ontological gap regarding consciousness.
perspectivevon Stillfried (2018) argues that David Chalmers' definition of consciousness is circular because, if experience is assumed to be the only intrinsic evidence, the causal structure of time-space cannot be differentiated from cognitive structures, a problem previously demonstrated by David Hume and Immanuel Kant.
claimNikolaus von Stillfried elaborated on a systematic analysis of David Chalmers' implicit presumptions, rather than Chalmers himself doing so.
claimVon Stillfried (2018) attributes central importance to direct phenomenal judgments (DPJ) as a key argument against epiphenomenalism, despite David Chalmers's later reluctance regarding his earlier writings on the topic.
claimDavid Chalmers does not appear to distinguish between the fact of incorrigible phenomenal experiencing (what it is like to be) and the supposed existence of 'the phenomenal' as an irreducible ontic category, according to observations by von Stillfried.
perspectiveVon Stillfried argues that David Chalmers's concept of acquaintance solves the epistemological question of how one knows they have consciousness, but fails to solve the ontological question of why there is concordance between phenomenal experience and physical correlata or whether consciousness is explanatorily relevant.