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Nikolaus von Stillfried
Also known as: Von Stillfried
Facts (25)
Sources
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 25 facts
perspectivevon Stillfried argues that a priori entailment of macrophenomenal in microphenomenal properties is not a necessary requirement for a coherent naturalist interpretation of Russellian panpsychism.
perspectiveVon Stillfried expresses discomfort with substance-like concepts of consciousness, such as those found in interactionism and substance dualism, because they imply that physical systems might behave differently depending on whether they interact with 'mind-stuff'.
claimVon Stillfried concludes that there are valid reasons for David Chalmers's transition from an epistemological gap to an ontological gap regarding consciousness.
claimVon Stillfried proposes two options for understanding the involvement of consciousness: either physical and phenomenal properties are always intrinsically correlated (panpsychism), or the phenomenal is an intrinsic essence of the physical (Russellian monism/aspect dualism).
claimNikolaus von Stillfried has attempted to synthesize ontological interpretations from the philosophy of mind and quantum physics into a single coherent theory of mind and matter.
claimAccording to von Stillfried (2018), emergentist proposals have substituted occasionalist and parallelistic views in recent decades, with notable proponents including Huxley (1874), Campbell (1970), Jackson (1982), Robinson (1988), and Bieri (1992).
claimVon Stillfried argues that even if the identity-thesis of intrinsic essence and phenomenal properties is true, it fails to explain why humans experience things in specific ways or the extent to which the relation between the physical and the phenomenal is contingent.
perspectivevon Stillfried (2018) argues that David Chalmers' definition of consciousness is circular because, if experience is assumed to be the only intrinsic evidence, the causal structure of time-space cannot be differentiated from cognitive structures, a problem previously demonstrated by David Hume and Immanuel Kant.
referenceNikolaus von Stillfried's 2018 habilitation thesis provides an in-depth comparative analysis of the discourse surrounding the hard problem of consciousness and quantum-theoretically informed attempts to develop a natural theory of mind and matter.
perspectiveThe author suggests, following von Stillfried, that assuming intrinsic relata or quiddities are logically necessary provides a more coherent picture than assuming a world made up of relations between empty relata.
perspectiveVon Stillfried argues that if epiphenomenalism is true, consciousness cannot effectuate physical events, making second-order phenomenal judgments impossible because a zombie twin would utter the same phrases without actual consciousness.
claimVon Stillfried distinguishes between 'strong' epiphenomenalism, which denies any interaction between mind and body, and 'weak' epiphenomenalism, which only denies the causal role of consciousness.
perspectiveNikolaus von Stillfried emphasizes that he does not doubt the existence of consciousness, viewing experience as a fundamental empirical fact, which leads him to find solipsism more plausible than physicalism.
claimThe author defines 'monism' exclusively as eliminative monisms (referred to as 'negative approaches' by von Stillfried in 2018) and classifies all non-eliminative ontologies (von Stillfried's 'positive approaches') as types of dualism, specifically distinguishing between substance and aspect dualism.
referenceVon Stillfried (2018) proposes a classification system for philosophy of mind that differentiates between 'positive' and 'negative' approaches, following a hierarchy of propensity to success or usefulness regarding the problems at stake.
quoteNiels von Stillfried (2018) states: “In unserem wissenschaftlichen Weltbild, sowohl dem geisteswissenschaftlichen als auch, noch eklatanter, dem naturwissenschaftlichen, offenbart sich an zentraler Stelle ein fundamentaler Konflikt: Das ‘Medium’, durch das wir all unsere Erkenntnisse über ‘die Welt’ überhaupt erst erlangen, nämlich das Bewusstsein, fügt sich in das aus diesen Erkenntnissen abgeleitete Weltbild nicht ein. So gut unsere theoretischen Modelle der Realität uns in die Lage versetzen, ihre Prozesse zu verstehen, vorherzusagen und sogar zu gestalten, so unbefriedigend und herausfordernd ist, zumindest für mich, dieser fundamentale weiße Fleck auf der epistemologischen Landkarte”.
claimNikolaus von Stillfried elaborated on a systematic analysis of David Chalmers' implicit presumptions, rather than Chalmers himself doing so.
claimVon Stillfried (2018) attributes central importance to direct phenomenal judgments (DPJ) as a key argument against epiphenomenalism, despite David Chalmers's later reluctance regarding his earlier writings on the topic.
claimVon Stillfried suggests that a quantum theoretical interpretation of the phenomenal-physical dualism, analogous to wave-particle duality, may help solve the combination problem.
claimDavid Chalmers does not appear to distinguish between the fact of incorrigible phenomenal experiencing (what it is like to be) and the supposed existence of 'the phenomenal' as an irreducible ontic category, according to observations by von Stillfried.
perspectiveThe author of the text takes an optimistic view on the combination problem, following the perspective of von Stillfried.
perspectiveVon Stillfried argues that David Chalmers's concept of acquaintance solves the epistemological question of how one knows they have consciousness, but fails to solve the ontological question of why there is concordance between phenomenal experience and physical correlata or whether consciousness is explanatorily relevant.
claimRichard Rorty (1979) presents arguments similar to those of von Stillfried regarding the circularity of definitions of consciousness.
referenceNikolaus von Stillfried published the habilitation thesis 'Vom Innen der Dinge: Das “Bewusstsein-Körper-Problem” und die “Welle-Teilchen-Dualität”: Interdisziplinäre Impulse zwischen Quantentheorie und analytischer Philosophie des Geistes' at the University of Trier in 2018.
claimVon Stillfried argues that the physical world is continuous, whereas consciousness is discontinuous, as evidenced by the interruption of experience during sleep or coma while the physical world remains stable.