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David Chalmers is the philosopher who introduced and coined the term 'hard problem' of consciousness [1], [2], [3], [4]. He distinguishes this concept from 'easy problems' by arguing that the hard problem involves subjective experience that cannot be explained through functional or mechanistic means [5], [6], [7], [8].
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The Problem of Hard and Easy Problems cambridge.org 6 facts
referenceThe second criterion for distinguishing between hard and easy problems, as presented by David Chalmers, stipulates that it is legitimate to ask why the performance of specific cognitive and behavioral functions is accompanied by subjective experience.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that consciousness is intrinsically and fundamentally special, posing a 'hard problem' that is unlike any other problem in science.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that while most phenomena in the life sciences are 'easy problems' that can be explained mechanistically, the phenomenon of consciousness is a mechanistically intractable 'hard problem'.
claimDavid Chalmers defines 'easy problems' of consciousness as those characterized by functional definability and mechanistic explainability, while the 'hard problem' is characterized by the absence of these properties.
referenceThe first criterion for distinguishing between hard and easy problems, as presented by David Chalmers, is functional definability. If a phenomenon is functionally definable, it can be explained by specifying a mechanism; however, because consciousness is not about functions, it is not amenable to a mechanistic explanation.
claimDavid Chalmers distinguishes between two explanatory projects within a science of consciousness: the 'hard problem' and the 'easy problems'.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 5 facts
perspectiveDavid Chalmers states that while the meta-problem is technically an 'easy problem', it is deeply connected to the hard problem, with some theories suggesting that solving the meta-problem will solve or dissolve the hard problem, while others suggest it will at least constrain the form of a solution.
perspectiveDaniel Dennett argues that the 'hard problem' of consciousness will be solved as a byproduct of solving the 'easy problems' defined by David Chalmers.
claimThinkers who made arguments similar to David Chalmers's formulation of the hard problem include Isaac Newton, John Locke, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, John Stuart Mill, and Thomas Henry Huxley.
claimIn his 2014 book 'Consciousness and the Brain', Dehaene rejected the concept of qualia and argued that David Chalmers' 'easy problems' of consciousness are actually the hard problems.
claimThe philosopher David Chalmers coined the terms "hard problem" and "easy problems" in a 1994 talk.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 3 facts
claimCritics Mills and Price argue that David Chalmers' invocation of fundamental laws to bridge physics and consciousness fails to solve the hard problem, instead providing only a sophisticated set of correlations.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that functional explanation, while sufficient for solving the 'easy problems' of consciousness, is not automatically suited to answering the 'hard problem'.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers acknowledges that treating consciousness as fundamental provides a clear research program, effectively turning the 'hard problem' into an 'easy problem' (distinct from the 'Easy problem' of cognitive function) that is not intractable in principle.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 2 facts
quoteDavid Chalmers stated in 1995: "What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?"
claimDavid Chalmers coined the term 'hard problem' in 1995 and 1996, though the concept is a long-standing element of the mind-body problem.
David Chalmers Thinks the Hard Problem Is Really Hard scientificamerican.com 2 facts
accountDavid Chalmers first used the phrase 'hard problem' in a public talk at the 'Toward a Scientific Basis of Consciousness' meeting held in Tucson in 1994.
claimDavid Chalmers coined the term 'hard problem' in the early 1990s to distinguish the subjective experience of consciousness from cognitive functions like 'self-monitoring', which he labeled the 'easy stuff'.
Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Consciousness and the Intermediate ... frontiersin.org 1 fact
referenceDavid Chalmers introduced the concept of the 'hard problem' of consciousness in his 1996 book, which posits that even after all material facts about a system are fixed, there remains a subjective experience that requires explanation.