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hard problem
Also known as: hard problems
Facts (60)
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Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 16 facts
quoteKeith Frankish concludes that illusionism 'replaces the hard problem with the illusion problem—the problem of explaining how the illusion of phenomenality arises and why it is so powerful.'
quoteAnd then there is the theory put forward by philosopher Colin McGinn that our vertigo when pondering the Hard Problem is itself a quirk of our brains. The brain is a product of evolution, and just as animal brains have their limitations, we have ours. Our brains can't hold a hundred numbers in memory, can't visualize seven-dimensional space and perhaps can't intuitively grasp why neural information processing observed from the outside should give rise to subjective experience on the inside.
quoteKeith Frankish states: 'Theories of consciousness typically address the hard problem. They accept that phenomenal consciousness is real and aim to explain how it comes to exist. There is, however, another approach, which holds that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion and aims to explain why it seems to exist.'
perspectiveSean Carroll stated on his podcast 'Mindscape' that he believes the idea of a 'hard problem' of consciousness that cannot be transposed is wrong.
claimBaars and two colleagues argue that there is no hard problem of explaining qualia distinct from the problem of explaining causal functions, because qualia are entailed by neural activity and are themselves causal.
perspectiveDaniel Dennett argues that the 'hard problem' of experience is included within the 'easy problems' of consciousness, and therefore they must be explained together as a cohesive unit.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers states that while the meta-problem is technically an 'easy problem', it is deeply connected to the hard problem, with some theories suggesting that solving the meta-problem will solve or dissolve the hard problem, while others suggest it will at least constrain the form of a solution.
perspectiveSteven Pinker endorses the weaker version of new mysterianism, which posits that the human inability to solve the Hard Problem is a result of evolutionary limitations on the human brain.
perspectiveJacy Reese Anthis argues that the 'hard problem' of consciousness will dissolve when the issue is tackled with 'formal argumentation' and 'precise semantics'.
referenceBrian Jonathan Garrett authored an article titled 'What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the 'Hard Problem'' published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in May 2006.
perspectiveDaniel Dennett argues that the 'hard problem' of consciousness will be solved as a byproduct of solving the 'easy problems' defined by David Chalmers.
quoteA. C. Elitzur argued: "While [GWT] does not address the 'hard problem', namely, the very nature of consciousness, it constrains any theory that attempts to do so and provides important insights into the relation between consciousness and cognition."
claimThinkers who made arguments similar to David Chalmers's formulation of the hard problem include Isaac Newton, John Locke, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, John Stuart Mill, and Thomas Henry Huxley.
claimIn his 2014 book 'Consciousness and the Brain', Dehaene rejected the concept of qualia and argued that David Chalmers' 'easy problems' of consciousness are actually the hard problems.
claimThe philosopher David Chalmers coined the terms "hard problem" and "easy problems" in a 1994 talk.
referenceDan Arnold explored the philosophy of mind's 'hard problem' in the context of Buddhist Idealism in the 2021 book 'Philosophy's Big Questions: Comparing Buddhist and Western Approaches'.
The Problem of Hard and Easy Problems cambridge.org Mar 31, 2023 14 facts
referenceThe second criterion for distinguishing between hard and easy problems, as presented by David Chalmers, stipulates that it is legitimate to ask why the performance of specific cognitive and behavioral functions is accompanied by subjective experience.
perspectiveThe author argues that a phenomenon exceeding the performance of functions in its vicinity is not a unique property of consciousness, nor does it indicate a mechanistically intractable 'hard problem.'
claimThe evaluation conducted in 'The Problem of Hard and Easy Problems' concludes that none of the three proposed criteria can accurately discriminate between the 'hard problem' of consciousness and the 'easy problems' of mechanistically explainable phenomena.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that consciousness is intrinsically and fundamentally special, posing a 'hard problem' that is unlike any other problem in science.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that while most phenomena in the life sciences are 'easy problems' that can be explained mechanistically, the phenomenon of consciousness is a mechanistically intractable 'hard problem'.
claimDavid Chalmers defines 'easy problems' of consciousness as those characterized by functional definability and mechanistic explainability, while the 'hard problem' is characterized by the absence of these properties.
claimThe functional undefinability criterion for distinguishing hard and easy problems lacks specificity because it fails to demonstrate that all or most other phenomena are functionally definable.
referenceThe first criterion for distinguishing between hard and easy problems, as presented by David Chalmers, is functional definability. If a phenomenon is functionally definable, it can be explained by specifying a mechanism; however, because consciousness is not about functions, it is not amenable to a mechanistic explanation.
referenceThe 'hard problem' of consciousness is characterized by the fact that it is not a problem about the performance of functions.
claimThe demarcation between 'hard' and 'easy' problems relies on the distinction between subjective first-person data and objective third-person data.
claimDavid Chalmers distinguishes between two explanatory projects within a science of consciousness: the 'hard problem' and the 'easy problems'.
claimThe author defines the 'hard problem' as a mechanistically unexplainable phenomenon and the 'easy problem' as a mechanistically explainable phenomenon.
claimThe evaluation conducted in the source paper concludes that no proposed criteria for distinguishing between 'hard' and 'easy' problems successfully identifies consciousness as a uniquely mechanistically unexplainable phenomenon.
claimThe paper 'The Problem of Hard and Easy Problems' evaluates whether three proposed classification criteria can successfully discriminate between the 'hard problem' of consciousness and mechanistically explained phenomena.
Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Consciousness and the Intermediate ... frontiersin.org Apr 17, 2018 8 facts
claimThe 'hard problem' of consciousness, GOFAC approaches, and the strong versus weak machine consciousness argument all share a common factor: they treat consciousness as lacking any causal role in the world.
claimThe hypothesis that physical properties are different from subjective (phenomenal) properties is unproven and serves as the foundation for the 'hard problem' framework.
quoteAnil Seth stated: “how to account for the various properties of consciousness regarding biological mechanisms; without pretending it doesn't exist (easy problem) and without worrying too much about explaining its existence in the first place (hard problem).”
perspectiveThe author argues that GOFAC will never achieve machine consciousness and that a robust conceptual framework alternative to the hard problem is required.
perspectiveThe authors argue that progress in artificial consciousness is hampered by the 'hard problem' premise, which posits that consciousness is distinct from the physical world.
referenceDavid Chalmers introduced the concept of the 'hard problem' of consciousness in his 1996 book, which posits that even after all material facts about a system are fixed, there remains a subjective experience that requires explanation.
claimAnil Seth proposes that the 'real problem' of consciousness involves accounting for the properties of consciousness regarding biological mechanisms without ignoring its existence (the easy problem) and without attempting to explain its fundamental existence (the hard problem).
claimThe 'zombie' argument in the context of the hard problem refers to a cognitively equivalent agent that lacks consciousness.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 8 facts
claimCritics Mills and Price argue that David Chalmers' invocation of fundamental laws to bridge physics and consciousness fails to solve the hard problem, instead providing only a sophisticated set of correlations.
referenceP. Hut and R. Shepard authored the paper 'Turning the "hard problem" upside-down and sideways,' which was published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 3, pages 313-329.
referenceW.S. Robinson authored the paper 'The hardness of the hard problem,' which was published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 3, pages 14-25, in 1996.
referenceJ. Shear authored the paper 'The hard problem: Closing the empirical gap,' which was published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 3, pages 54-68, in 1996.
referenceG.H. Rosenberg authored the paper 'Rethinking nature: A hard problem within the hard problem,' which was published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 3, pages 76-88, in 1996.
referenceBilodeau, D.J. (1996) authored 'Physics, machines, and the hard problem', published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:386-401.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that functional explanation, while sufficient for solving the 'easy problems' of consciousness, is not automatically suited to answering the 'hard problem'.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers acknowledges that treating consciousness as fundamental provides a clear research program, effectively turning the 'hard problem' into an 'easy problem' (distinct from the 'Easy problem' of cognitive function) that is not intractable in principle.
(PDF) Cross-Cultural Approaches to Consciousness - Academia.edu academia.edu 2 facts
claimThe scientific community has attempted to answer questions regarding how and where consciousness emerges, but these questions remain unsolved and are considered a 'hard problem'.
claimContemporary studies of consciousness distinguish between two notions of consciousness: one that can be explained by science and another, known as the 'Hard Problem', which cannot.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 2 facts
quoteDavid Chalmers stated in 1995: "What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?"
claimDavid Chalmers coined the term 'hard problem' in 1995 and 1996, though the concept is a long-standing element of the mind-body problem.
David Chalmers Thinks the Hard Problem Is Really Hard scientificamerican.com Apr 10, 2017 2 facts
accountDavid Chalmers first used the phrase 'hard problem' in a public talk at the 'Toward a Scientific Basis of Consciousness' meeting held in Tucson in 1994.
claimDavid Chalmers coined the term 'hard problem' in the early 1990s to distinguish the subjective experience of consciousness from cognitive functions like 'self-monitoring', which he labeled the 'easy stuff'.
Unknown source 1 fact
claimThe 'hard problem' of consciousness is defined as the challenge of understanding why and how physical processes are associated with consciousness, specifically questioning why humans are not simply robots or philosophical zombies.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Jun 18, 2004 1 fact
claimTheories using proto-psychic properties to solve the Hard Problem face a dilemma: if these properties have qualitative phenomenal feel, their ubiquity is difficult to explain; if they lack qualitative feel, they fail to explain qualitative consciousness.
The “Hard Problem of Consciousness” Arises from Human Psychology pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 1 fact
claimThe 'hard problem' of consciousness emerges from two intuitive biases inherent in human psychology: Essentialism and Dualism.
Psychedelics and Consciousness: Distinctions, Demarcations, and ... blossomanalysis.com 1 fact
claimThe authors of the paper 'Psychedelics and Consciousness: Distinctions, Demarcations, and Opportunities' emphasize the necessity of epistemic humility, specifically advocating for the separation of modest, testable scientific claims regarding the contents and functions of consciousness from stronger, more speculative claims about solving the 'hard problem' of how subjective experience arises.
What is hard about the “hard problem of consciousness”? philosophy.stackexchange.com Nov 18, 2020 1 fact
claimThe 'Hard Problem' of consciousness claim is built on the same conceptual notions as Frank Jackson's 'Knowledge Argument', which is also known as 'Mary’s Room' or 'Mary the Color Scientist'.
The Mechanisms of Psychedelic Visionary Experiences - Frontiers frontiersin.org Sep 27, 2017 1 fact
referenceFrancisco Varela published 'Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy for the hard problem' in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in 1996 (J. Conscious. Stud. 3, 330–349).
Theories and Methods of Consciousness biomedres.us Jan 29, 2024 1 fact
referencePolák M and Marvan T published 'How to Mitigate the Hard Problem by Adopting the Dual Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness' in Frontiers in Psychology in 2019.
Non-Reductive Physicalism - Theories of Consciousness theoriesofconsciousness.com 1 fact
claimThe Hard Problem challenges non-reductive physicalism by asking how physical processes give rise to subjective experience; the response is that non-reductive physicalism attributes the explanatory gap to epistemological limitations rather than ontological differences.