Knowledge Tree
Relations (1)
related 3.46 — strongly supporting 8 facts
Panpsychism is fundamentally defined by the philosophical claim that fundamental physical entities possess mental properties, as evidenced by [1], [2], and [3]. Furthermore, historical and contemporary arguments for the theory, such as those by Ernst Häckel and Hedda Hassel Mørch, explicitly rely on the ascription of mental properties to matter to explain nature or causal powers [4], [5].
Facts (8)
Sources
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu 4 facts
perspectiveThe author of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Panpsychism argues that the objection from causal closure suffers from an intentional fallacy because properties described in physical terms may be identical to mental properties.
claimCritics argue that panpsychism is a vestige of primitive pre-scientific beliefs because modern scientific explanations do not require the ascription of mental properties to physical entities.
perspectiveThe author of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Panpsychism argues that the informational and mutual monitoring aspects of physical properties provide an independent argument for regarding those properties as mental.
perspectiveThe author of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Panpsychism argues that describing physical entities in terms of their dispositions to interact does not preclude those entities from having mental properties.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 2 facts
claimErnst Häckel (1834–1919) interpreted the evolutionary connection between humans and the rest of nature as evidence for panpsychism and was willing to ascribe mental properties to living cells.
claimPanpsychists do not necessarily hold that every object has a mind; rather, they argue that the fundamental parts of objects, such as the parts of a rock, possess mental properties.
Panpsychism - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
perspectiveHedda Hassel Mørch advocates for a view of panpsychism arguing that the only causal powers we can positively conceive of are mental properties, specifically those involving volition, motivation, or agency.
Consciousness, Physicalism, and Panpsychism - R Discovery discovery.researcher.life 1 fact
claimNeutral monism, as analyzed in the context of William James's philosophy, does not provide complete independence of a substance from mental and physical properties, which may lead the theory toward panpsychism unless it is an idealistic variety.