Knowledge Tree
mental properties
Facts (35)
Sources
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 7 facts
perspectiveThe author of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Panpsychism argues that the objection from causal closure suffers from an intentional fallacy because properties described in physical terms may be identical to mental properties.
claimThe principle of the causal closure of the physical world asserts that for every physical event, there is a purely physical explanation for its occurrence that makes no reference to mental properties.
claimEmergentists bear the burden of either providing a clear explanation for the emergence of consciousness from physical features or convincing others to accept that mental properties are conditioned by complex physical states in an inexplicable way.
claimCritics argue that panpsychism is a vestige of primitive pre-scientific beliefs because modern scientific explanations do not require the ascription of mental properties to physical entities.
accountR. Lotze conducted experiments showing that parts of polyps could grow into complete, new polyps, which was used to suggest by analogy that mental properties might be inherent in the basic structures of the world.
perspectiveThe author of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Panpsychism argues that the informational and mutual monitoring aspects of physical properties provide an independent argument for regarding those properties as mental.
perspectiveThe author of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Panpsychism argues that describing physical entities in terms of their dispositions to interact does not preclude those entities from having mental properties.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Jun 18, 2004 5 facts
claimThe multiple realization objection, proposed by Fodor (1974) and Hellman and Thompson (1975), argues that mental properties are abstract and can be realized by diverse structural or chemical substrates, making strict identity with physical properties impossible.
claimRepresentationalism functions as a qualified form of eliminativism because it denies the existence of mental properties that are not representational, such as qualia understood as intrinsic monadic properties of conscious states.
claimIdentity theory, specifically psycho-physical type-type identity theory, identifies conscious mental properties, states, and processes with physical ones, typically of a neural or neurophysiological nature.
claimRepresentationalist theory posits that if two conscious or experiential states share all their representational properties, they will not differ in any mental respect.
claimType-type identity theory defines mental properties as identical to physical properties, similar to how the property of being water is identical to the property of being composed of H2O molecules.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 5 facts
claimSubjective idealism differs from dual-aspect monism by asserting that the single substance possesses only mental properties throughout, and that physical properties are observer-dependent and not fully real.
claimDual-aspect monism posits that the physical and mental (or protomental) are two complementary aspects of a single underlying substance, where physical properties appear from a third-person, scientific perspective, and mental properties appear from a first-person, introspective perspective.
claimProperty dualism differs from dual-aspect monism by asserting that physical and mental properties are causally related or sharply distinct, rather than being complementary aspects, and typically posits that only some things possess mental properties.
claimPhysicalism differs from dual-aspect monism by asserting that the single substance possesses only physical properties throughout, with mental properties being constituted by physical properties.
claimSubjective idealism posits that only mental properties are fundamental, while physicalism posits that only physical properties are fundamental.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 3 facts
claimThe mind-body problem is the philosophical inquiry into the relationship between the mind and the body, or between mental properties and physical properties.
claimInteractionism faces a significant objection because mental properties, states, or substances are often considered to be of radically different kinds from physical ones, which supposedly prevents the communality necessary for interaction.
claimMental properties, which include consciousness (such as perceptual and emotional experience) and intentionality (such as beliefs and desires), are private to the subject and involve a form of privileged access that no one else has to the physical.
Non-Reductive Physicalism - Theories of Consciousness theoriesofconsciousness.com 3 facts
claimThe Causal Exclusion Problem challenges non-reductive physicalism by asking what causal work is left for mental properties if physical causes are sufficient to explain all effects; the response is that mental properties are patterns in physical causes that influence outcomes through organizational properties.
claimNon-reductive physicalism distinguishes itself from property dualism by maintaining that mental properties are entirely dependent on and determined by physical properties.
claimSupervenience in non-reductive physicalism is the principle that mental properties depend on physical properties, meaning no mental change can occur without a corresponding physical change, even though mental properties are not identical to physical ones.
Panpsychism - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 2 facts
perspectiveHedda Hassel Mørch advocates for a view of panpsychism arguing that the only causal powers we can positively conceive of are mental properties, specifically those involving volition, motivation, or agency.
perspectiveJosiah Royce held that reality is a 'world self,' which is a conscious being comprising everything, though he did not necessarily attribute mental properties to the smallest constituents of mentalistic systems.
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Nov 30, 2004 2 facts
claimRussell and the neo-Russellians posit that the compositional arrangements of psychophysically neutral elements determine the differences between mental and physical properties, rendering both reducible to a neutral domain.
referenceDavid Chalmers' 1996 work on 'consciousness and information' classifies mental and physical properties as reducible to a psychophysically neutral domain.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 18, 2017 2 facts
claimErnst Häckel (1834–1919) interpreted the evolutionary connection between humans and the rest of nature as evidence for panpsychism and was willing to ascribe mental properties to living cells.
claimPanpsychists do not necessarily hold that every object has a mind; rather, they argue that the fundamental parts of objects, such as the parts of a rock, possess mental properties.
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 13, 2017 2 facts
claimHarry Frankfurt claims that defining personhood as having both mental and physical properties is inadequate because many non-person entities possess both.
claimA common argument for introspective self-awareness is that in introspection, one is perceptually aware of one's own mental properties, and perceiving a property implies perceiving that which has that property (the self).
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 1 fact
claimErnst Häckel was an early proponent of Darwinism who was willing to ascribe mental properties to living cells.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 1 fact
claimThe concept of 'transparency' suggests that when subjects reflect on their experience, they do not find distinctively mental properties, but rather the basic sensory features of the world that they represent.
Consciousness, Physicalism, and Panpsychism - R Discovery discovery.researcher.life May 1, 2013 1 fact
claimNeutral monism, as analyzed in the context of William James's philosophy, does not provide complete independence of a substance from mental and physical properties, which may lead the theory toward panpsychism unless it is an idealistic variety.
Episode 2: The Hard Problem of Consciousness – David Chalmers ... futurepointdigital.substack.com Jul 24, 2025 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers supports property dualism, which is the idea that mental properties are not reducible to physical ones, even if they are tightly correlated.