Relations (1)

related 3.00 — strongly supporting 7 facts

Dualism and dual-aspect monism are related as distinct metaphysical frameworks often compared in philosophical discourse, such as when discussing their shared challenges with mental combination [1] or their categorization within ontological models [2]. They are frequently contrasted as alternative positions within the same debate {fact:1, fact:2, fact:5}, and dual-aspect monism is specifically noted for sharing certain characteristics with dualism, such as the treatment of consciousness as non-physical [3].

Facts (7)

Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 3 facts
claimThe 'solving two problems at once' argument, which posits that dual-aspect monism avoids the problems of physicalism and dualism, is considered the most important argument for the dual-aspect monism view.
claimDual-aspect monism is compatible with the epistemic gap because it regards consciousness as non-physical, similar to dualism.
claimExplaining mental combination leads to problems for dual-aspect monism that are strongly analogous to the problems faced by physicalism and dualism.
PANPSYCHISM (Philosophy of Mind Series) - Amazon.com amazon.com Amazon 2 facts
perspectiveThe author argues that Galen Strawson's terminology regarding physicalism is confusing because his definition allows for a person to be a 'physicalist' while simultaneously holding views such as neutral monism, dual-aspect monism, dualism, or idealism.
perspectiveThe reviewer argues that panpsychism is not limited to physicalism but can be integrated into any metaphysical system, including neutral monism, dual-aspect monism, dualism, and idealism.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 fact
referenceDefenders of dual aspect theory, such as Baruch Spinoza (1677/2005), P. Strawson (1959), and Thomas Nagel (1986), argue that the hard problem of consciousness necessitates a rethinking of basic ontology without necessarily entailing dualism.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com Springer 1 fact
claimOntological models are often categorized as 'monism' (including neutral monism, dual aspect monism, type-F monism, and Russell's monism) or 'dualism' (including aspect-dualism and naturalistic dualism) based on how they interpret properties as aspects or emergent ontic categories.