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cross_type 2.32 — strongly supporting 4 facts
Daniel Dennett is a philosopher who has extensively theorized about the nature of experience, specifically arguing that it can be reduced to functional or behavioral processes [1], [2]. His reductive claims regarding experience have been a primary subject of critique by David Chalmers, who argues that such accounts fail to fully explain the nature of experience [3], [4].
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Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 2 facts
claimDavid Chalmers argues that even if Daniel Dennett could demonstrate that function is required for experience, this does not prove that function is the only aspect of experience that requires explanation.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that Daniel Dennett's reductive accounts of phenomena like 'cuteness' and 'perception' fail to support reductionism about experience because they either lack plausibility or rely on experiential properties that reductive accounts omit.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
perspectiveDaniel Dennett argues that the phenomenon of having experience is nothing more than the performance of functions or the production of behavior, which are the 'easy problems' of consciousness.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 1 fact
referenceDaniel Dennett argued in 1988 that if qualia are construed as non-relational, intrinsic qualities of experience, one might deny that qualia exist.