Relations (1)
cross_type 2.32 — strongly supporting 4 facts
Daniel Dennett is directly related to phenomenology through his critical analysis of the concept, where he argues against its existence as a distinct phenomenon [1], claims it has failed due to a lack of methodological consensus [2], and asserts that his own phenomenological observations reveal only functional processes [3]. Furthermore, his specific interpretation of phenomenology has been the subject of academic debate regarding his conflation of the term with other cognitive frameworks [4].
Facts (4)
Sources
Consciousness and Cognitive Sciences journal-psychoanalysis.eu 3 facts
claimDaniel Dennett asserts in his 1991 book that Phenomenology has failed because it has not established a settled method that researchers can agree upon.
quoteDaniel Dennett, in his 1991 work, argues against the existence of actual phenomenology, stating: "There is no such phenomenon as really seeming–over and above the phenomenon of judging in one way or another that something is the case… But what about the actual phenomenology? There is no such thing."
perspectiveThe author of the article 'Consciousness and Cognitive Sciences' argues that Daniel Dennett incorrectly conflates Impressionism, Introspectionism, and Phenomenology, and mistakenly assumes that universal agreement is necessary to validate a research program.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 1 fact
claimDaniel Dennett argues that his own phenomenology reveals only functions that require explanation.