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David Chalmers is closely associated with Type-B materialism as its prominent critic and former proponent, having classified it as a materialist response to the hard problem of consciousness [1], critiqued it for relying on explanatorily primitive identities [2], [3], [4], [5], and previously held the position himself for many years [6].
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Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 12 facts
perspectiveDavid Chalmers critiques the type-B materialist approach of Andy Clark and Valerie Hardcastle by arguing that it treats the identity between physical states and conscious states as an explanatorily primitive, brute fact about nature that requires no further explanation.
claimDavid Chalmers characterizes Type-B materialism as a 'solution by stipulation' because it asserts that brain states are conscious states without explaining how this identity occurs.
claimType-B materialists attempt to preserve materialism by arguing that the bridging principles required for consciousness are 'identities', a position David Chalmers criticizes as philosophically problematic and requiring ungrounded forms of necessity.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that type-B materialism posits an identification in place of an explanation and fails to provide a reductive explanation of consciousness because it relies on an explanatorily primitive axiom to bridge the gap between physical processes and consciousness.
accountDavid Chalmers previously held the position of Type-B materialism for many years before concluding it was untenable.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that a consistent type-B materialist must embrace explanatorily primitive identities that are logically independent of physical facts and inexplicable metaphysical necessities.
claimDavid Chalmers categorizes materialist responses to the 'hard problem' of consciousness into two types: type-A materialism, which denies the existence of a hard problem distinct from easy problems, and type-B materialism, which accepts the existence of a distinct problem but argues it can be accommodated within a materialist framework.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers posits that if type-B materialism is accepted, the resulting explanatory picture resembles his own naturalistic dualism more than standard materialism, as it abandons the attempt to explain consciousness solely through physical processes.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that the 'type-B materialism' position is fundamentally philosophical because it relies on explanatorily primitive identities and brute metaphysical necessities.
claimDavid Chalmers states that a type-B materialist would need to infer bridging principles from systematic regularities between physical processes and phenomenological data, where the latter plays an ineliminable role.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers concludes that Type-B materialism cannot work because explaining consciousness requires an ingredient beyond structure and function, which physical theories do not provide.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that Type-B materialism requires an appeal to a primitive axiom identifying consciousness with a physical process, which is not derivable from physical facts and differs from identity statements found elsewhere in science.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers' 2002 classification system, which distinguishes between type-A/B/C/Q materialisms, type-D/E dualisms, and type-F monism, has become a standard reference in the philosophy of mind.