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Type-B materialism
Also known as: Type-B materialism, Type-B Materialists, type-B materialist
Facts (27)
Sources
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 18 facts
perspectiveDavid Chalmers critiques the type-B materialist approach of Andy Clark and Valerie Hardcastle by arguing that it treats the identity between physical states and conscious states as an explanatorily primitive, brute fact about nature that requires no further explanation.
claimDavid Chalmers characterizes Type-B materialism as a 'solution by stipulation' because it asserts that brain states are conscious states without explaining how this identity occurs.
claimType-B materialists attempt to preserve materialism by arguing that the bridging principles required for consciousness are 'identities', a position David Chalmers criticizes as philosophically problematic and requiring ungrounded forms of necessity.
claimProponents of type-B materialism, such as Andy Clark and Valerie Hardcastle, argue that while consciousness is not a priori equivalent to structural or functional properties, it is identical a posteriori, established through correlations between consciousness and physical processes.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that type-B materialism posits an identification in place of an explanation and fails to provide a reductive explanation of consciousness because it relies on an explanatorily primitive axiom to bridge the gap between physical processes and consciousness.
accountDavid Chalmers previously held the position of Type-B materialism for many years before concluding it was untenable.
claimAndy Clark and Valerie Hardcastle advocate for a type-B materialism that reconciles realism about phenomenal consciousness with materialism by positing an empirical identity between conscious experiences and physical processes.
claimType-B materialists argue that a world physically identical to ours but lacking consciousness is conceivable but not 'metaphysically possible' because consciousness is identical to a physical process, a view supported by Valerie Hardcastle and Andy Clark.
claimType-B materialism accepts that there is a real phenomenon of consciousness that is conceptually distinct from the performance of functions, and seeks to account for it through an a posteriori identity between consciousness and physical or functional properties.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that a consistent type-B materialist must embrace explanatorily primitive identities that are logically independent of physical facts and inexplicable metaphysical necessities.
claimDavid Chalmers categorizes materialist responses to the 'hard problem' of consciousness into two types: type-A materialism, which denies the existence of a hard problem distinct from easy problems, and type-B materialism, which accepts the existence of a distinct problem but argues it can be accommodated within a materialist framework.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers posits that if type-B materialism is accepted, the resulting explanatory picture resembles his own naturalistic dualism more than standard materialism, as it abandons the attempt to explain consciousness solely through physical processes.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that the 'type-B materialism' position is fundamentally philosophical because it relies on explanatorily primitive identities and brute metaphysical necessities.
claimPhilosophical positions held by Clark and Hardcastle are classified as type-B materialism because they rely on an a posteriori identity between consciousness and physical or functional properties.
claimDavid Chalmers states that a type-B materialist would need to infer bridging principles from systematic regularities between physical processes and phenomenological data, where the latter plays an ineliminable role.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers concludes that Type-B materialism cannot work because explaining consciousness requires an ingredient beyond structure and function, which physical theories do not provide.
claimType-B materialism accepts that there is a phenomenon of consciousness that is conceptually distinct from the performance of functions, but maintains that this phenomenon can still be explained within a materialist framework.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that Type-B materialism requires an appeal to a primitive axiom identifying consciousness with a physical process, which is not derivable from physical facts and differs from identity statements found elsewhere in science.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 8 facts
claimThe "hard-wired/soft-wired distinction" refers to the disagreement among Type-B Materialists regarding whether intuitions about the hard problem of consciousness are innate (hard-wired) or culturally conditioned (soft-wired).
claimType-B Materialists believe that while there is a gap between introspection and neuroscience that will not be resolved by understanding neurobiology, consciousness and neurobiology are identical in reality.
claimType-B Materialists accept inconceivability arguments used to support the hard problem of consciousness, but argue these arguments only provide insight into how the human mind conceptualizes the relationship between mind and matter, not the true nature of that relationship.
claimType-B materialism, also known as weak reductionism or a posteriori physicalism, posits that the hard problem of consciousness stems from human psychology rather than a genuine ontological gap between consciousness and the physical world.
claimType-B Materialism refers to the "hard-wired view" of consciousness.
referenceJanet Levin published 'Taking Type-B Materialism Seriously' in the journal Mind and Language.
claimDavid Papineau, Joseph Levine, and Janet Levine are notable philosophers who subscribe to Type-B Materialism.
claimType-C materialism is compatible with several metaphysical views and may resolve into other types depending on scientific discovery: it resolves to strong reductionism (Type A) with evidence of emergence, Type-B materialism with a different cultural paradigm, property dualism (Type D) if explained by the quantum mind, or Type-F monism if intrinsic properties in physics extend beyond structure and dynamics.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers' 2002 classification system, which distinguishes between type-A/B/C/Q materialisms, type-D/E dualisms, and type-F monism, has become a standard reference in the philosophy of mind.