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David Chalmers uses water as a comparative benchmark to argue that consciousness is fundamentally different from physical phenomena, noting that while water's high-level properties are implied by low-level facts [1], consciousness lacks this reductive explanation [2]. He further highlights that unlike water, which is inconceivable to lack in a world with its constituent parts, consciousness is often argued to be conceivable in its absence [3].
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Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 3 facts
claimDavid Chalmers contrasts the conceivability of a world without consciousness with worlds without life, genes, or water, noting that the latter are not remotely conceivable.
claimDavid Chalmers contends that in cases like water or life, low-level facts imply high-level facts without requiring primitive identity statements, whereas consciousness requires a primitive identity of a different kind.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that analogies comparing consciousness to water or life are irrelevant because they reverse the direction of explanation, which in reductive explanation must proceed from micro to macro.