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Relations (1)
cross_type 0.80 — strongly supporting 8 facts
David Chalmers is a primary proponent of property dualism, explicitly characterizing his own view of consciousness as such in [1] and [2]. Furthermore, he has historically identified his philosophical position using the term 'property dualism' in his writings, as noted in [3] and [4].
Facts (8)
Sources
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 4 facts
claimDavid Chalmers has referred to aspect dualism using various terms, including 'Type-F monism' (2002), 'Russellian monism' (2010), and 'property dualism' (1995).
claimDavid Chalmers holds that 'substance dualism' leads to implications comparable to 'property dualism'.
perspectiveThe author rejects the use of the term 'property dualism' due to the perceived fuzziness of David Chalmers' definition, which the author claims mixes two different categories of entities.
claimDavid Chalmers relates 'property dualism' to both the phenomenal and physical properties of an individual, and to emergent ontic properties of an underlying, more fundamental ontic substance.
David Chalmers - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers characterizes his view of consciousness as property dualism.
Panpsychism - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers writes in 'The Conscious Mind' that in some instances, the differences between Russell's neutral monism and his own property dualism are merely semantic.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers is open to substance dualism, despite his preference for property dualism.
Episode 2: The Hard Problem of Consciousness – David Chalmers ... futurepointdigital.substack.com 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers supports property dualism, which is the idea that mental properties are not reducible to physical ones, even if they are tightly correlated.