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property dualism
Also known as: property dualists
Facts (51)
Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 14 facts
claimProperty dualism is distinct from non-reductive physicalism.
claimWilliam Lycan and Dean Zimmerman argue that property dualism shares most of the same problems as substance dualism.
claimProperty dualism regards the mental and the physical as two fundamental kinds of properties that can belong to or inhere in the same substance.
claimProperty dualism asserts that both phenomenal properties and their specific instances are non-physical and fundamental.
claimProperty dualism is considered more parsimonious than substance dualism because it posits fewer fundamental things or kinds of things.
claimDavid Chalmers is open to substance dualism, despite his preference for property dualism.
claimMonism is the philosophical view that there is only one kind of stuff or substance, and this category includes physicalism, subjective idealism, property dualism, and dual-aspect monism.
claimProperty dualism differs from dual-aspect monism by asserting that physical and mental properties are causally related or sharply distinct, rather than being complementary aspects, and typically posits that only some things possess mental properties.
referenceJohn Locke may have first considered the possibility of property dualism by pondering the concept of 'thinking matter' as an alternative to René Descartes' theory of thinking non-material substances.
claimProperty dualists argue that the unity of consciousness can be accounted for without a distinct subject by adopting the deflationary view.
claimSusan Schneider and Galen Strawson argue that property dualism implies substance dualism.
claimProperty dualists argue that it is metaphysically possible for phenomenal consciousness to inhere in a substance that does not have physical properties, while maintaining that this is nomologically impossible (incompatible with actual psychophysical laws).
claimProperty dualism may posit that phenomenal properties must inhere in a physical substance, which provides an explanation for why consciousness depends on the brain and cannot exist disembodied.
claimScientifically oriented philosophers tend to prefer property dualism.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 13 facts
accountUntil the early twentieth century, it was common to believe that biological phenomena, or 'life,' required property dualism involving an irreducible 'vital force'.
claimThe argument from predicate dualism to property dualism asserts that irreducible special sciences are not wholly objective like physics because they depend on interest-relative perspectives on the world.
claimThe argument for property dualism arises from the difficulty of explaining how humans can be 'semantic engines'—driven by the meaning of thoughts—if the brain is merely a syntactic engine.
claimProperty dualism is the view that there are irreducible or immaterial properties, though property dualists may differ on what kinds of objects possess these properties.
claimThe zombie argument establishes only property dualism, and a property dualist might consider disembodied existence inconceivable if they believe the identity of a mind through time depends on its relation to a body.
claimProperty dualism is the philosophical position that there are two essentially different kinds of properties in the world, which is a stronger claim than predicate dualism.
perspectiveThe perspectivality of special sciences suggests a link to property dualism because having a perspective is a psychological state, implying that irreducible special sciences presuppose the existence of a mind.
claimMainstream philosophy experienced a modest revival of property dualism during the last decade of the twentieth century due to discontent with physicalism.
claimThe knowledge argument establishes at least a state or property dualism because the facts Harpo learns about the nature of experience are non-physical.
claimDualism is categorized into three primary types: substance dualism, property dualism, and predicate dualism.
claimGenuine property dualism asserts that the ontology of physics is insufficient to constitute what exists, requiring that there be something more than what is allowed for in the initial ontology of physics.
perspectiveProperty dualism regarding the mind is defended by those who argue that the qualitative nature of consciousness is a genuinely emergent phenomenon rather than merely a way of categorizing brain states or behavior.
claimOutside of psychology, the special physical sciences are generally considered to involve only predicate dualism rather than property dualism.
Dualism, Physicalism, and Philosophy of Mind - Capturing Christianity capturingchristianity.com Dec 11, 2019 6 facts
claimPhysicalists must deny property dualism by arguing that either qualia do not exist or that qualia are not something over and above the physical.
claimProperty dualism, when treated as a thesis about phenomenal consciousness, asserts that qualia are something over and above physical phenomena.
claimProperty dualism claims that at least some mental states are not reducible to physical states, meaning conscious beings instantiate two radically different kinds of properties—mental and physical—neither of which is reducible to the other.
perspectiveThe author of the Capturing Christianity article asserts that property dualism is sufficient to support their intended argument for theism.
claimProperty dualism does not require the belief in an immaterial soul; it allows for the possibility that the subject of experiences is a brain or body that possesses both ordinary physical properties and irreducibly mental properties.
perspectiveThe author of the Capturing Christianity article argues for property dualism, though they acknowledge that some philosophers view property dualism as an unstable position that should logically lead to substance dualism.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 4 facts
claimDavid Chalmers has referred to aspect dualism using various terms, including 'Type-F monism' (2002), 'Russellian monism' (2010), and 'property dualism' (1995).
claimDavid Chalmers holds that 'substance dualism' leads to implications comparable to 'property dualism'.
perspectiveThe author rejects the use of the term 'property dualism' due to the perceived fuzziness of David Chalmers' definition, which the author claims mixes two different categories of entities.
claimDavid Chalmers relates 'property dualism' to both the phenomenal and physical properties of an individual, and to emergent ontic properties of an underlying, more fundamental ontic substance.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Jun 18, 2004 3 facts
claimSubstance dualists and property dualists are required to develop theories that articulate the specific natures of the non-physical features of reality they equate with or use to explain consciousness.
perspectiveNeutral monism may not be classified as a version of property dualism if dualism is defined as the existence of two distinct realms of fundamental entities, because neutral monism does not regard either mental or physical properties as ultimate or fundamental.
claimProperty dualism asserts the existence of conscious properties that are neither identical to nor reducible to physical properties, even though these conscious properties may be instantiated by the same entities that instantiate physical properties.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 2 facts
claimInteractionist dualism, encompassing both substance and property types, holds that consciousness is causally efficacious in the production of bodily behavior.
claimProperty dualism holds that the conscious mind is not a separate substance from the physical brain, but that phenomenal properties are nonphysical properties of the brain.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 2 facts
claimType-C materialism is compatible with several metaphysical views and may resolve into other types depending on scientific discovery: it resolves to strong reductionism (Type A) with evidence of emergence, Type-B materialism with a different cultural paradigm, property dualism (Type D) if explained by the quantum mind, or Type-F monism if intrinsic properties in physics extend beyond structure and dynamics.
claimProperty dualism, as accepted by 21st-century dualists, posits that there is only one substance (the physical), but that this substance has both mental and physical properties.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 18, 2017 1 fact
referenceThe chapter "Orthodox Property Dualism + Linguistic Theory of Vagueness = Panpsychism" by Philip Goff was published in the book "Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience", edited by Richard Brown, by Springer in Dordrecht in 2013, pages 75–91.
Critique of Panpsychism: Philosophical Coherence and Scientific ... thequran.love May 7, 2025 1 fact
claimPanpsychism can be interpreted as a form of property dualism characterized by an infinite proliferation of souls, where every particle is considered to have a soul.
David Chalmers - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers characterizes his view of consciousness as property dualism.
Panpsychism - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers writes in 'The Conscious Mind' that in some instances, the differences between Russell's neutral monism and his own property dualism are merely semantic.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 1 fact
claimBruce MacLennan's theory posits an irreducible phenomenal aspect associated with neural processes, resulting in a property dualism with a neurodynamical focus.
Non-Reductive Physicalism - Theories of Consciousness theoriesofconsciousness.com 1 fact
claimNon-reductive physicalism distinguishes itself from property dualism by maintaining that mental properties are entirely dependent on and determined by physical properties.
Episode 2: The Hard Problem of Consciousness – David Chalmers ... futurepointdigital.substack.com Jul 24, 2025 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers supports property dualism, which is the idea that mental properties are not reducible to physical ones, even if they are tightly correlated.