Knowledge Tree
Relations (1)
cross_type 0.20 — supporting 2 facts
David Chalmers is related to the knowledge argument through his belief that Mary gains new, irreducible knowledge of 'what red looks like' upon first seeing red, beyond her physical knowledge [1], and his observation that the argument does not refute physicalism due to possible supervenience of experience on the physical [2].
Facts (2)
Sources
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers believes that when Mary, the neuroscientist in the knowledge argument, sees the color red for the first time, she gains new knowledge of 'what red looks like' that is distinct from and irreducible to her prior physical knowledge of the brain or visual system.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers observes that the knowledge argument by itself does not refute physicalism because experience might supervene on the physical, meaning experience could be explicable in terms of physical facts.