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related 3.32 — strongly supporting 9 facts
Phenomenal consciousness and qualia are intrinsically linked as the former is defined by the presence of the latter, often described as 'what it is like' to have an experience [1]. Philosophers frequently discuss them interchangeably or as a package deal, with debates centering on whether phenomenal consciousness can exist without qualia [2] or if both are merely fictions {fact:2, fact:9}.
Facts (9)
Sources
Dualism, Physicalism, and Philosophy of Mind - Capturing Christianity capturingchristianity.com 3 facts
claimProperty dualism, when treated as a thesis about phenomenal consciousness, asserts that qualia are something over and above physical phenomena.
quoteKim states: “consciousness-bashing still goes on in some quarters, with some reputable philosophers arguing that phenomenal consciousness, or ‘qualia,’ is a fiction of bad philosophy… It is an ironic fact that the felt qualities of conscious experience, perhaps the only things that ultimately matter to us, are often… jettisoned outright as artifacts of confused minds.”
claimSome philosophers reject the existence of qualia and the existence of ourselves as persisting subjects of experience, arguing that phenomenal consciousness is a fiction of bad philosophy.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 3 facts
claimIn 2005, philosopher Peter Carruthers proposed that 'recognitional concepts of experience'—defined as the capacity to recognize a type of experience when it occurs in one's own mental life—could explain phenomenal consciousness without positing qualia.
claimThe computational theory of mind asserts that both cognition and phenomenal consciousness (qualia) are computational processes realized by neurons, implying that artificial intelligence could theoretically be conscious.
claimPatricia Churchland and Paul Churchland have applied eliminative materialism to propositional attitudes, while Daniel Dennett, Georges Rey, and Keith Frankish have applied it to qualia or phenomenal consciousness.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
claimThe 'hard problem of consciousness' refers to the question of why neurophysical processes are correlated with qualitative experience (qualia), or the phenomenal aspect of consciousness, and how this correlation can be explained.
[PDF] The Hard Problem of Consciousness & The Progressivism of ... fds.duke.edu 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers defines phenomenal consciousness as 'the hard problem' because qualia resists functional characterization.
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence? A Framework for Classifying ... arxiv.org 1 fact
claimThe authors of 'Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence? A Framework for Classifying Objections and Constraints' define consciousness as phenomenal consciousness, which Thomas Nagel described as the fact of there being 'something it is like' to be a system, involving qualia or subjective experience.