Relations (1)

cross_type 0.50 — strongly supporting 5 facts

David Chalmers is related to interactionism because he has defended it as a plausible position [1] and explored how it might resolve the problem of epiphenomenalism [2]. Furthermore, his 'Type-F Monism' integrates elements of interactionism to address its limitations [3], and he is frequently discussed in academic literature alongside interactionism as a key figure in the debate over consciousness [4].

Facts (5)

Sources
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com Springer 2 facts
perspectiveThe author argues that if David Chalmers and his followers are correct that panpsychism avoids the serious problems faced by monist materialism, interactionism, and epiphenomenalism, then further investment in solving the combination problem is warranted.
claimDavid Chalmers developed a naturalistic aspect dualist interpretation of Russellian Monism, referred to as 'Type-F Monism', which integrates elements of both interactionism and epiphenomenalism to address their respective limitations.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Wikipedia 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers has defended versions of both interactionism and epiphenomenalism as plausible positions.
The Conscious Mind - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org David Chalmers · Oxford University Press 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers proposes that a theory of consciousness should dispel epiphenomenalism without relying on interactionism.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers suggests that interactionists can solve the epiphenomenalism problem by arguing that certain nodes in the causal network, such as psychons, are intrinsically experiential, meaning they are experiential through and through even if the causal story can be told without mentioning experience.