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Interactionism and epiphenomenalism are both categorized as dualist accounts of the causal relationship between the mental and the physical [1], representing two of the four primary positions on mental causation [2]. They are frequently contrasted because interactionism attributes a causal role to consciousness while epiphenomenalism denies it [3], and both are often evaluated together regarding their shared challenges in explaining the emergence of phenomenal properties {fact:1, fact:11}.
Facts (19)
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The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 10 facts
claimEpiphenomenalism attempts to avoid the problems of interactionism by denying consciousness any causal role, but it fails to explain how consciousness emerges from physical processes without reducing the former to the latter.
claimVon Stillfried (2018) observes that a radical interpretation of Bertrand Russell's ideas regarding protophenomenal properties might be necessary to explain direct phenomenal judgements, potentially solving problems that epiphenomenalism and interactionism cannot.
claimInteractionism refers to approaches that attribute a causal role to consciousness, implying that mind and body influence each other, whereas epiphenomenalism refers to approaches that deny any influence of the mind on the body.
perspectiveThe author argues that if David Chalmers and his followers are correct that panpsychism avoids the serious problems faced by monist materialism, interactionism, and epiphenomenalism, then further investment in solving the combination problem is warranted.
claimSubstance dualisms, such as interactionism and epiphenomenalism, are logically possible but face significant objections.
claimThe combination problem is not restricted to panpsychism, but also applies to interactionism and epiphenomenalism.
claimDavid Chalmers developed a naturalistic aspect dualist interpretation of Russellian Monism, referred to as 'Type-F Monism', which integrates elements of both interactionism and epiphenomenalism to address their respective limitations.
claimSubstance dualism theories, including interactionism and epiphenomenalism, fail to explain the emergence of phenomenal properties from the physical as a distinct ontic substance.
claimInteractionists and epiphenomenalists face the challenge of explaining how phenomenal experience emerges from physical processes, as both are considered irreducible to each other.
claimConstitutive pan(proto)psychism is viewed as a potential solution to the hard problem of consciousness because it avoids the specific problems associated with substance dualism, interactionism, and epiphenomenalism.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org 5 facts
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that their position is less unattractive than the alternatives, specifically claiming that physicalism is refuted by the epistemic gap and interactionism is refuted by physical causal closure.
referenceCritics argue that non-epiphenomenalist theories, specifically interactionism and physicalism, face the same explanatory challenges as epiphenomenalism regarding why specific psychophysical laws or constitution relations exist (Robinson 2007; Corabi 2014).
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that the lack of elegance in their theory is a moot point if competing theories like physicalism and interactionism are already refuted by the epistemic gap and physical causal closure.
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that non-epiphenomenalist theories, such as physicalism and interactionism, face the same improbability issues as epiphenomenalism because they must posit specific two-way psychophysical laws or identity relations to explain correlations between physical and mental states.
claimThere are four possible positions on mental causation: interactionism (which implies violation of physical causal closure), epiphenomenalism, overdetermination, and physicalism.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 2 facts
The Conscious Mind - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers proposes that a theory of consciousness should dispel epiphenomenalism without relying on interactionism.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers suggests that interactionists can solve the epiphenomenalism problem by arguing that certain nodes in the causal network, such as psychons, are intrinsically experiential, meaning they are experiential through and through even if the causal story can be told without mentioning experience.