Relations (1)

related 7.85 — strongly supporting 110 facts

Saudi Arabia and Iran are regional rivals whose relationship is defined by geopolitical tensions, proxy conflicts, and a 2023 diplomatic rapprochement brokered by China, as evidenced by [1], [2], and [3]. Their interactions are frequently analyzed in the context of regional security, defense spending, and strategic competition, as noted in [4], [5], and [6].

Facts (110)

Sources
Opportunities for Collective Regional Security in the Middle East carnegieendowment.org Amr Hamzawy · Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 20 facts
accountIn the spring of 2023, China brokered a diplomatic agreement that restored diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which had been severed in 2016.
claimThe 2023 diplomatic success between Saudi Arabia and Iran led to a decrease in military confrontations in Yemen, a partial withdrawal of Saudi and Emirati forces, and a noticeable decrease in Houthi aggression against Saudi and Emirati territories.
perspectiveSaudi Arabia's strategic focus is on advancing its Vision 2030 modernization agenda, maintaining calm with Iran, stabilizing the Arab Mashreq, and pursuing strategic dialogues with the United States regarding peaceful nuclear programs and regional normalization.
claimEgypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Türkiye, Israel, and Iran recalibrated their foreign policies in response to the instability and shifting landscape caused by the Arab Spring.
claimIran’s diplomatic and economic gains achieved between 2020 and 2023, including restored relations with Saudi Arabia, revitalized trade with the UAE, and emerging dialogues with Egypt and Jordan, have eroded due to the strains of the war.
claimThe Arab Spring uprisings caused radical changes to the foreign policies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Türkiye, Israel, and Iran, similar to how previous conflicts like the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the American invasion of Iraq reshaped the region.
claimRegional actors are currently involved in direct or proxy conflicts: Israel is in tension with Iran; Türkiye is intervening in Syria and Iraq; the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are militarily involved in Yemen; and Egypt is involved in Libya, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa.
claimBy October 7, 2023, Iran reestablished diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia through Chinese mediation, which facilitated relative stability in Yemen.
claimSaudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates sought to contain Iranian regional expansion in Bahrain, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
claimTürkiye has achieved strategic gains in Syria by capitalizing on Iran’s diminishing influence in the Arab Mashreq and coordinating diplomatically with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt.
accountRegional powers including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Türkiye, and Iran actively sought to secure their national interests during the instability following the 2011 uprisings.
claimSaudi Arabia's ability to shield itself from regional fallout is threatened by direct and proxy conflicts between Israel, Iran, and Türkiye, necessitating a robust collective security arrangement to achieve its domestic and strategic priorities.
claimEgypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Türkiye, Israel, and Iran possess significant political, military, economic, and diplomatic influence that allows them to impact regional stability in the Middle East.
accountPrior to October 2023, Saudi Arabia was distancing itself from regional conflicts like the war in Yemen and normalizing relations with Iran in exchange for security guarantees.
claimFollowing the 2023 restoration of diplomatic relations, Saudi Arabia and Iran committed to respecting each other’s sovereignty and refraining from interfering in internal affairs.
accountIn the spring of 2023, China brokered a diplomatic agreement that restored diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which had been severed in 2016 due to hostilities in Yemen.
claimIran and Saudi Arabia reached an accord to restore diplomatic ties and de-escalate the conflict in Yemen.
claimBefore October 7, 2023, regional actors adopted varied strategies to increase security: Saudi Arabia sought to ease tensions with Iran, the United Arab Emirates focused on deepening cooperation with Israel, Egypt prioritized national security amidst domestic challenges, and Türkiye reduced its engagement in regional conflicts.
claimThe feasibility of a collective regional security endeavor led by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Türkiye, Israel, and Iran is contingent on overcoming significant obstacles, including mutual distrust, conflicting strategic goals, and the divergent policies of their respective governments.
measurementThe proxy war in Yemen, fought between Iran-backed Houthis and a Saudi-led coalition including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, claimed thousands of lives and displaced millions of people between 2015 and 2023.
From Arab Spring to regional reset: Saudi-Iranian rivalry ... - Frontiers frontiersin.org Frontiers 17 facts
referenceWorld Politics Review published the article 'Iran and Saudi Arabia Battle for Supremacy in the Middle East' in Tampa, FL in 2024.
referenceCanadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (2018) published the factsheet 'Saudi Arabia & Iran: A Regional Rivalry'.
referenceCerioli (2021) authored the thesis 'The Persian Gulf's Strategic Triangle: The relations between the United States, Iran, and Saudi Arabia from 1969 to 2014 under Neoclassical Realism' at Philipps-Universität Marburg.
referenceWorld Politics Review published an article in 2024 titled 'Iran and Saudi Arabia Battle for Supremacy in the Middle East'.
referenceH. Cohen and G. Hitman's 2021 article, 'Iran and Saudi Arabia civilio-theo-zation clash: reformulating regional strategies following the Arab Spring,' analyzes the ideological and strategic clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the post-Arab Spring period.
referenceM. Gul, S. M. Abbasi, and S. Haider authored the article 'Iran and Saudi Arabia's strategic rivalry and the Middle Eastern security: an assessment,' published in the Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal in 2021.
claimM. Fantappie and V. Nasr argued in 2023 that the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia could potentially transform the Middle East order.
referenceT. R. Grumet authored the work 'New Middle East Cold War: Saudi Arabia and Iran's Rivalry,' published by the University of Denver in Denver, CO in 2015.
referenceM. Salami published 'Saudi-Iranian Reconciliation and its Impact on Iraq' through the Centre Francais de Recherche sur l'Irak (CFRI) in 2023.
referenceN. Baghernia's 2024 article, 'China's marginal involvement in the 2023 Iran–Saudi Arabia reconciliation,' analyzes the role of China in the diplomatic reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
referenceM. Fantappie and V. Nasr authored the article 'A New Order in the Middle East? Iran and Saudi Arabia's Rapprochement Could Transform the Region,' published by Foreign Affairs in New York, NY in 2023.
referenceL. Alotaibi's 2023 analysis, 'Saudi Arabia and Iran: Beyond Geopolitics,' explores the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, arguing for factors beyond traditional geopolitical analysis.
referenceM. Gul, S. M. Abbasi, and S. Haider assessed the strategic rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia and its impact on Middle Eastern security in 2021.
referenceCanadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (CJPME) published a 2018 factsheet titled 'Saudi Arabia & Iran: A Regional Rivalry,' which outlines the dynamics of the rivalry between the two nations.
referenceCohen and Hitman (2021) published 'Iran and Saudi Arabia civilio-theo-zation clash: reformulating regional strategies following the Arab Spring' in the journal Trames.
claimT. R. Grumet characterized the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran as a 'New Middle East Cold War' in a 2015 publication.
referenceL. G. Cerioli's 2021 work, 'The Persian Gulf's Strategic Triangle: The relations between the United States, Iran, and Saudi Arabia from 1969 to 2014 under Neoclassical Realism,' applies Neoclassical Realism to analyze the strategic interactions between the US, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.
War by Proxy: Iran's Growing Footprint in the Middle East - CSIS csis.org CSIS 7 facts
claimThe Economist reported on March 8, 2018, that Saudi Arabia's use of soft power in Iraq is causing nervousness in Iran.
claimThe Houthis have used Iranian weapons and parts, including ballistic missiles and drones, to threaten shipping near the Bab el Mandeb Strait and to attack land-based targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
claimThe regional conflict involving Iran includes the war in Yemen, the Houthi use of ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia, an escalating conflict with Israel in Syria, the growth of Shia militia forces in Iraq, targeted assassinations, and cyberattacks.
claimIran's strategic objectives in Yemen include retaining or increasing its influence along the Red Sea and weakening Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
claimThe regional conflict involving Iran includes the war in Yemen, the Houthi use of ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia, an escalating conflict with Israel in Syria, the growth of Shia militia forces in Iraq, targeted assassinations, and cyberattacks.
claimIranian activism and the proliferation of Iranian-backed non-state actors have alarmed regional governments, including Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco, facilitating broader regional balancing against Iran.
perspectiveIran's strategic objectives in Yemen include retaining and increasing its influence along the Red Sea, as well as weakening Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The crises in the Middle East: reshaping the region's geopolitical ... link.springer.com Springer 6 facts
claimSaudi Arabia and Iran maintain similarly positive and peaceful relations with all five main members of the BRICS group.
claimSaudi Arabia and Iran are competing for regional leadership and influence in conflicts occurring in Yemen, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, which exacerbates sectarian divisions and undermines stability.
claimThe regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has a significant impact on the evolution of the regional order in the Middle East.
claimIran maintains a stance on Palestinian resistance against Israel that is as strong or stronger than that of Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
claimThe geopolitical rivalry between the Shia and Sunni blocs, represented by Iran and Saudi Arabia, has fueled sectarian tensions and proxy wars in Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq, and Yemen, complicating peaceful conflict resolution.
claimHeibach and Cerioli (2024) identify the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran as a defining feature of the Middle East's political landscape, driven by Shia-Sunni sectarian tensions, ideological differences, and geopolitical ambitions.
Iran at a Historical Crossroads - E-International Relations e-ir.info E-International Relations 6 facts
claimIran's 'forward defense' doctrine historically relied on the threat of multiple proxy fronts—such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Saudi Arabia, and Iraqi militias against US bases—to deter attacks on Iran.
claimA Foreign Affairs analysis suggests that by 2025, Iran faces the potential collapse of key proxies, including the Houthis in Yemen, which would diminish Iran's ability to use them as an active proxy against Saudi Arabia.
claimIran views the Houthi militia in Yemen as part of its 'four capitals' of influence and has used them to pressure Saudi Arabia through cross-border missile attacks and threats to Red Sea shipping lanes.
accountIran re-established diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia in 2023 through a China-brokered reconciliation agreement, a move intended to reduce regional isolation and attract investment.
claimThe partial détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia established in 2023 may not hold if Iran is perceived as weak.
accountA regional détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023, combined with ongoing peace talks in Yemen, has reduced hostilities between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia.
Iran's Proxy Strategy and the Extent of Surrogate Autonomy - AHS alexanderhamiltonsociety.org Alexander Hamilton Society 6 facts
claimIran supports the Ansar Allah movement to leverage Houthi combatants to undermine the Saudi status quo in the region, which Iran views as a maximal reward for a minimal commitment.
measurementIn 2014, Iran's defense budget was $14 billion, which was two-thirds of Abu Dhabi's $22.7 billion budget and significantly smaller than Saudi Arabia's nearly $81 billion allocation.
claimThe relationship between Iran and the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) has evolved into a collaborative partnership, characterized by Houthi attacks on Saudi and Western targets and the adoption of Iranian anti-Israel rhetoric.
accountIran's relationship with the Ansar Allah movement began as a delegative one, with Iran providing rhetorical support and limited arms to maintain distance from the conflict. As Saudi coalition victories increased, Iran transitioned from passive support to active support, including the deployment of IRGC-QF advisors to the conflict.
claimSaudi Arabia views Yemen as its sphere of influence, similar to how Iran views Iraq.
referenceDina Esfandiary and Ariane M. Tabatabai analyzed the geopolitical tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia in a Lawfare blog post titled 'Defusing the Iran-Saudi Powder Keg' published on May 29, 2017.
Experts react: How the US war with Iran is playing out around the ... atlanticcouncil.org Atlantic Council 6 facts
accountIn the escalation linked to US-Israeli strikes on Iran, Iranian missiles or projectiles hit Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, despite none of these states launching attacks against Iran from their territory.
accountIran expanded the circle of combatants during the conflict by targeting infrastructure in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.
accountDuring the escalation linked to US-Israeli strikes on Iran, Iranian missiles or projectiles hit Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, despite none of these states launching attacks against Iran from their territory.
accountDuring the escalation linked to US-Israeli strikes on Iran, Iranian missiles or projectiles hit Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, despite none of these states launching attacks against Iran.
claimIran expanded the circle of combatants by targeting infrastructure in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.
accountDuring the conflict, Iran targeted infrastructure in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.
5 key factors shaping Iran's foreign policy calculus mei.edu Middle East Institute 6 facts
claimGulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, have pivoted from religiously driven policies to trade-focused, globally integrated strategies, allowing them to outpace Iran in regional influence.
claimThe reliance of hardline foreign policy analysts on religious rhetoric and anti-Western slogans has alienated Iran from the international system, while Persian Gulf rivals like Saudi Arabia have surged ahead through pragmatic, trade-focused diplomacy.
claimIran-Saudi relations are currently at a two-decade high, though this détente functions as a means of mutual risk management rather than a foundation for enduring stability.
perspectiveIran's diplomatic overtures to the United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China likely signify pragmatic moves for short-term benefit rather than fundamental ideological shifts in foreign policy.
claimSaudi Arabia's economic and diplomatic transformation serves as a model for Iran, demonstrating that survival in a globalized world requires adaptability rather than ideological rigidity.
claimThe 2023 China-brokered rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia represents a tactical move toward de-escalation, though long-term Gulf stability remains uncertain.
Analysis - The Iran War: Strategic Implications for Israel, the Gulf ... elnetwork.eu EL Network 3 facts
perspectiveSaudi Arabia views Iran as a central strategic challenge while simultaneously seeking to avoid sliding into a direct confrontation.
claimThe Gulf states, comprising Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait, are not formal parties to the war with Iran but are positioned at the center of the conflict due to their geographic proximity and vulnerability.
claimThe war underscores for Saudi leadership the importance of regional cooperation in addressing the Iranian threat, while making public progress toward full normalization with Israel more politically difficult due to fears of Iranian retaliation.
Iran and the Gulf: Why Hedging Is No Longer Enough warontherocks.com Bader Al-Saif, Sanam Vakil · War on the Rocks 3 facts
accountSaudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman engaged in diplomacy that prevented a direct conflict between Iran and the United States in January 2026.
claimGulf states have been pursuing a strategy of adaptation and engagement since the Saudi-Iran détente of 2023.
procedureThe process of institutionalized cooperation between Iran and Gulf states involves two primary steps: (1) agreeing to and activating joint principles at a faster pace than the 2023 China-brokered Iran–Saudi rapprochement, and (2) working on tangible projects such as a joint maritime security strategy and a new regional security architecture.
Iran Country Report 2026 - BTI Transformation Index bti-project.org BTI Project 2 facts
claimIran entered a diplomatic rapprochement with Saudi Arabia in 2023.
claimIran prioritized good-neighborly relations since the beginning of the 2020s, which resulted in a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia in 2023.
Iran War: Kinetic, Cyber, Electronic and Psychological Warfare ... resecurity.com Resecurity 2 facts
claimThe United States advised American citizens to immediately leave Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen due to escalating Iranian strikes and planned US retaliatory strikes.
accountIranian missile and drone attacks have targeted civilian and military infrastructure in Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Qatar.
The Implications Of Iran's Failed Proxy Strategy - Hoover Institution hoover.org Hoover Institution 2 facts
claimThe establishment of a viable Palestinian state, as called for by Saudi Arabia, would weaken Iran's regional leverage by removing a key issue that Iran uses to radicalize the region and incite violence.
claimAt its height, Iran's proxy network threatened Israel and Saudi Arabia while retaining the capacity to disrupt global trade routes in an arc running from the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Sustainability through business model innovation and climate ... nature.com Nature 2 facts
claimThe Asian subset of countries analyzed in the research includes India, Iran, China, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
claimThe Asian sample in the study comprises 11 developing countries: India, Iran, China, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
The Limits of Iran's Proxy Empire | The New Yorker newyorker.com The New Yorker 2 facts
claimThe Houthis could potentially execute a joint pincer movement against Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf nations by firing long-range missiles from the south, while Iran simultaneously strikes these countries from the north.
claimThe Houthis could execute a joint pincer movement with Iran by firing long-range missiles at Israel and targeting the oil, energy, and economic infrastructure of Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf nations from the south, while Iran strikes those same countries from the north.
Escalation in the Middle East and Beyond unocha.org UN OCHA 2 facts
claimIranian strikes have killed or injured civilians, including migrant workers, in Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
claimIranian strikes have caused civilian casualties and infrastructure damage in Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
United States and Iran on the Brink: What's at Stake? - CSIS csis.org CSIS 2 facts
claimIran has proposed the idea of a regional consortium for uranium enrichment, where enrichment would occur in Oman using Iranian centrifuges, and the resulting enriched uranium would be stored in Saudi Arabia, allowing Iran to claim it is not enriching on its own soil.
perspectiveSaudi Arabia is nervous about the pressure tactics used by the United States and Israel against Iran because they fear these actions undermine regional stability.
After Khamenei: Regional Reckoning and the Future of Iran's Proxy ... stimson.org Stimson Center 2 facts
claimIn 2019, Iran attacked oil installations in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia following the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal and the reimposition of economic sanctions.
accountIn 2019, Iran attacked oil installations in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia following the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal and the subsequent reimposition of economic sanctions.
Miscellanea: The War in Iran - A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry acoup.blog A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry 1 fact
measurementThe war has resulted in the deaths of 13 American soldiers, 290 American soldiers wounded in action, 24 Israeli deaths, thousands of Israeli injuries, at least 1,000 civilian deaths in neutral countries (including Lebanon, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia), and at least 1,000 Iranian civilian deaths plus Iranian military losses.
How the war in Ukraine changed Russia's global standing | Brookings brookings.edu Brookings Institution 1 fact
claimPrior to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia had established itself as a regional player in the Middle East capable of maintaining diplomatic communication with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Gulf states, Iran, and Israel.
Escalating Middle East Conflict and Its Global Geostrategic ... diplomatmagazine.eu Qazi Zaheer Ahmad · Diplomat Magazine 1 fact
claimIranian officials deny involvement in drone attacks targeting Saudi Arabia or other neighboring states, arguing that other actors may be using copies of Iranian-designed Shahed drones to carry out attacks and falsely attribute them to Iran.
Geopolitical, Strategic, and Humanitarian Implications of ... ardd-jo.org Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development 1 fact
claimChina has limited its engagement in the Middle East to economic activities and selective diplomacy, most notably by brokering the Iran-Saudi rapprochement in 2023.
Iran's Islamist Proxies in the Middle East - Wilson Center wilsoncenter.org Ashley Lane · Wilson Center 1 fact
claimThe US Treasury and State Departments sanctioned Hamas Finance Committee leader in Saudi Arabia Mahir Jawad Yunis Salah in 2015 for overseeing the transfer of millions of dollars from Iran and Saudi Arabia to Hamas’ military wing.
History of the Central Intelligence Agency - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Wikipedia 1 fact
claimThe intervention in Iran resulted in an oil profit split of 60/40 in favor of Iran, which was potentially similar to agreements the United States held with Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.
The Arab Approach to Mediation—Reshaping Diplomacy in a ... washingtoninstitute.org The Washington Institute 1 fact
claimSaudi Arabia's de-escalation with Iran is part of a broader foreign policy strategy to support its socio-economic development plan, Vision 2030.
Military escalation and diverging regional strategies in the Middle East theloop.ecpr.eu Nadeem Ahmed Moonakal · The Loop 1 fact
claimSaudi Arabia and other Gulf states have pledged not to allow external powers to launch attacks on Iran from their territory to protect their national interests and domestic security.
Iran in crisis: the landscape after the Twelve-Day War - OSW osw.waw.pl OSW 1 fact
accountWorking in tandem with Russia, Iran secured control over Syria and countered regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Geopolitics of the energy transition: between global challenges and ... geoprogress-edition.eu Simona Epasto · Geoprogress Edition 1 fact
claimThe Israeli-Palestinian escalation and rivalry among regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey complicate the political conditions necessary to support energy cooperation and infrastructural investment.
United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships everycrsreport.com EveryCRSReport.com 1 fact
claimU.S. intelligence relations with Japan, Egypt, pre-revolutionary Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan were influenced by a mutual concern regarding the threat posed by the Soviet Union.
The Expanding Iran War - ISPI ispionline.it ISPI 1 fact
claimIran's strikes against Saudi Arabia reflect a broader strategy to potentially expand a bilateral confrontation into a wider regional conflict, including targeting locations associated with United States military presence or strategic interests.
Reforming Iran's Energy Policy: Strategies for Sustainability ... jpia.princeton.edu Behdad Gilzad Kohan, Hamid Dahouei · Journal of Public and International Affairs 1 fact
referenceThe energy reforms of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Norway, particularly the management and structure of their Sovereign Wealth Funds, serve as useful case studies for identifying feasible implementation strategies for Iran.
The path forward on Iran and its proxy forces - Brookings Institution brookings.edu Brookings 1 fact
claimThe October 7 attacks and the subsequent war in Gaza have served several Iranian objectives: elevating Tehran’s regional stature, emboldening its proxy network, blocking normalization efforts between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and weakening Israel.