Knowledge Tree
Relations (1)
cross_type 2.32 — strongly supporting 4 facts
Miranda Fricker is the philosopher who defines and analyzes the concept of testimony, specifically regarding testimonial injustice [1] and the epistemic responsibilities of hearers [2]. She further engages with the concept by critiquing non-reductionist views on the trust and gullibility associated with testimony {fact:3, fact:4}.
Facts (4)
Sources
Social Epistemology – Introduction to Philosophy - Rebus Press press.rebus.community 2 facts
perspectiveNon-reductionists argue that Miranda Fricker's objection regarding gullibility fails because monitoring for the trustworthiness of testimony does not need to be conscious, but can be unconscious and automatic.
perspectiveMiranda Fricker argues that non-reductionism licenses gullibility because it involves a presumptive right to trust testimony without requiring vigilance regarding the trustworthiness of that testimony.
Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 1 fact
claimMiranda Fricker suggests that a hearer (S) possesses an unusual amount of freedom regarding the formation of beliefs based on testimony.
Social Epistemology - Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science oecs.mit.edu 1 fact
claimMiranda Fricker defines testimonial injustice as occurring when someone gives less credence to the testimony of another person due to identity-based prejudices such as misogyny, racism, or classism.