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Miranda Fricker
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Social Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Feb 26, 2001 7 facts
accountMiranda Fricker illustrates hermeneutical injustice using the experience of women before the term 'sexual harassment' was coined.
claimScholars including Medina (2011), Mason (2011), Anderson (2012), Davis (2016), Lackey (2018), and Maitra (2018) have sought to amend or qualify Miranda Fricker's definitions of epistemic injustice.
claimMiranda Fricker introduced the term 'epistemic injustice' in her 2007 work to designate injustices that wrong a subject in their capacity as a knower.
referenceMiranda Fricker authored 'Group testimony? The making of a collective good informant', published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 2012.
claimIn the 2012 article 'Epistemic justice as a virtue of social institutions,' Miranda Fricker argues that epistemic justice functions as a virtue within social institutions.
accountMiranda Fricker illustrates testimonial injustice using the character Tom Robinson from the novel 'To Kill a Mockingbird', whose testimony as a Black man on trial for raping a white woman was prejudicially rejected by an all-white jury.
claimMiranda Fricker distinguishes between two kinds of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice.
Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 6 facts
perspectiveMiranda Fricker argues that a hearer (S) has a duty to monitor a speaker (T) for signs of untrustworthiness, and that neglecting this duty constitutes gullibility.
claimMiranda Fricker suggests that a subject (S) possesses an unusual amount of freedom regarding the formation of testimonially-based beliefs.
claimMiranda Fricker argues that those who advocate for a presumptive right to trust a testifier (T) must dispense with any duty in the subject (S) to monitor the testifier for signs of untrustworthiness.
perspectiveMiranda Fricker argues that those who advocate for a hearer's (S) presumptive right to trust a speaker (T) must abandon any duty for the hearer to monitor the speaker for signs of untrustworthiness.
claimMiranda Fricker suggests that a hearer (S) possesses an unusual amount of freedom regarding the formation of beliefs based on testimony.
claimMiranda Fricker argues that a subject (S) has a duty to monitor a testifier (T) for signs of untrustworthiness, and that neglecting this duty constitutes gullibility.
Social Epistemology - Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science oecs.mit.edu Jul 24, 2024 3 facts
claimJose Medina points out that Miranda Fricker (2007) suggests that only credibility deficits, defined as mistrusting a speaker when one should trust them, constitute a serious problem in social epistemology.
claimMiranda Fricker characterizes the unjust discounting of testimony as a 'credibility deficit' and argues that individuals who systematically apply these deficits embody the epistemic vice of testimonial injustice.
claimMiranda Fricker defines testimonial injustice as occurring when someone gives less credence to the testimony of another person due to identity-based prejudices such as misogyny, racism, or classism.
Virtue Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 9, 1999 3 facts
claimMiranda Fricker (2007) argues that epistemology should help individuals appreciate and respond to forms of epistemic injustice.
claimMiranda Fricker (2003, 2007) defines epistemic injustice as a harm inflicted upon an individual in their capacity as a potential knower, which manifests in several varieties.
claimThe virtue of corrective testimonial justice is a disposition to remain aware of and compensate for one's own prejudices by interfering with one's estimation of the value of someone's testimony, which Miranda Fricker (2003) argues is cultivated through social training.
Social Epistemology – Introduction to Philosophy - Rebus Press press.rebus.community 2 facts
perspectiveNon-reductionists argue that Miranda Fricker's objection regarding gullibility fails because monitoring for the trustworthiness of testimony does not need to be conscious, but can be unconscious and automatic.
perspectiveMiranda Fricker argues that non-reductionism licenses gullibility because it involves a presumptive right to trust testimony without requiring vigilance regarding the trustworthiness of that testimony.
Epistemological Problems of Testimony plato.stanford.edu Apr 1, 2021 2 facts
Virtue Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 9, 1999 1 fact
referenceMiranda Fricker published 'Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing' in Metaphilosophy in 2003, discussing the role of virtue in the context of epistemic injustice.
Epistemology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
referenceMiranda Fricker authored the book 'Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing', published by Oxford University Press in 2007.