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Testimony and perception are both categorized as fundamental epistemic sources of knowledge and justification, leading philosophers to debate whether testimony can be reduced to perception or if they share epistemic parity [1], [2], [3]. Epistemologists frequently compare the two to determine if testimony requires more stringent epistemic demands due to the potential for human deception, unlike the inanimate nature of perception [4], [5], [6].
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Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 34 facts
quotePeter Graham states: "That a source is a source of defeaters for beliefs from another source, or even from itself, does not show that the other source depends for justification on inferential support from another source, or even itself. … The fact that my perception defeats your testimony does not show that testimony is inferential and not direct. Indeed, the fact that testimony-based beliefs sometimes defeat perceptual beliefs does not show that testimony is prior to perception."
perspectiveGreen argues that epistemic parity between testimony, memory, and perception is a more economical and likely true account of epistemic phenomena than accounts that distinguish sharply between the three sources.
claimThe 'reactionary' epistemic position accepts only principles regarding a priori insight, internal experiences, and deduction, while rejecting principles related to memory, enumerative induction, inference to the best explanation, perception, and testimony.
perspectiveGreen (2006) argues that it is unclear whether testimony is fundamentally different from perception regarding the necessity of higher-order beliefs about the source.
claimSome epistemologists view testimony as a mechanism for spreading knowledge rather than creating it, contrasting it with perception, which is viewed as a source of knowledge for the epistemic community as a whole.
claimJennifer Lackey (2006) endorses the argument that testimony requires higher epistemic demands than perception because people can lie, whereas the physical environment cannot.
claimTreating a testifier as a machine, such as a telescope, transforms testimonially-based beliefs into perceptually-based beliefs by treating human beings as an environmental medium through which information passes.
quoteWeiner (2003) states: "When we form beliefs through perception, we may do so automatically, without any particular belief about how our perceptual system works. When we form beliefs through testimony, at some level we are aware that we are believing what a person says, and that this person is presenting her testimony as her own belief."
perspectivePaul Faulkner argues that because testimony originates from a person rather than an inanimate object, one should be more demanding regarding testimonially-based beliefs than perceptually-based beliefs.
claimGreen suggests that transforming perceptually-based beliefs into testimonially-based beliefs involves anthropomorphizing sense faculties by imagining a world where sense faculties are operated by individuals who present messages about the environment, resulting in the same structure of explanation for epistemic status.
claimRobert Audi (2006) asserts that testimony is operationally dependent on perception, noting that to receive testimony about the time, one must hear or otherwise perceive the speaker.
claimWhile some philosophers require positive reasons to believe in the reliability of a testifier, most do not insist that a subject must have a sufficiently large inductive base to justify an inference from other beliefs or reduce testimony to perception, memory, or inference.
claimIn his 2000 work, Shogenji argues that the reliability of perception can be confirmed through the use of perception without circularity, using reasoning similar to his argument for the reliability of testimony.
claimRecipients of testimony do not necessarily form higher-order beliefs about the reliability of that testimony, just as perceivers do not necessarily form higher-order beliefs about their perceptual faculties.
claimPaul Faulkner (2000) argues that testimony requires more stringent epistemic demands than perception because testimony originates from a person capable of deception, whereas inanimate objects in the perceptual environment do not.
claimPeter Graham defines a "reactionary" as someone who accepts only principles of a priori insight, internal experiences, and deduction, while rejecting principles related to memory, enumerative induction, inference to the best explanation, perception, and testimony.
claimThe nature of perception does not necessarily inhibit higher-order beliefs, and the nature of testimony does not necessarily produce higher-order beliefs.
claimThe 'conservative' epistemic position rejects only principles regarding perception and testimony.
quotePeter Graham (2004) states: “The central claim the Anti-Reductionist makes is that the epistemologies of perception, memory, and testimony should all look more or less alike.”
perspectiveConservatives in epistemology argue that transforming testimony into perception is not epistemically innocent because anthropomorphizing sense faculties introduces human agency, while treating a testifier as a perceptual device removes it.
perspectiveReductionism views testimony as akin to inference and places a relatively heavy burden on the recipient of testimony, whereas anti-reductionism views testimony as akin to perception or memory and places a relatively light burden on the recipient.
claimShogenji argues that the reliability of perception can be confirmed by the use of perception without circularity, using reasoning similar to his argument for the reliability of testimony.
claimGreen argues that the epistemic parity of testimony, memory, and perception follows from the epistemic innocence of transformations that turn instances of testimonially-based beliefs into instances of beliefs based on the other two sources, preserving the structure of the explanation of epistemic status.
referenceGraham (2004) examines the argument that because free actions are indeterministic, the environment for testimonially-based beliefs cannot be as regular and law-governed as the environment for perceptually-based beliefs.
claimPeter Graham (2006) argues that the fact that one source of knowledge can defeat another does not imply that the defeated source depends on inferential support from the other, nor does it show that testimony is inferior to perception.
claimPeter Graham defines a "conservative" as someone who rejects only principles regarding perception and testimony, a "moderate" as someone who rejects only the principle regarding testimony, and a "liberal" as someone who accepts the principle for testimony.
claimThomas Reid, a prototype non-reductionist, acknowledged significant disanalogies between beliefs based on perception and beliefs based on testimony.
quoteRobert Audi states: "[W]e cannot test the reliability of one of these basic sources [that is, for Audi, a source like perception or memory, but not testimony] or even confirm an instance of it without relying on that very source. … With testimony, one can, in principle, check reliability using any of the standard basic sources."
quoteGalen Strawson (1994) suggests that testimony as a source of belief requires other sources like perception, stating: "[T]he employment of perception and memory is a necessary condition of the acquisition and retention of any knowledge (or belief) which is communicated linguistically…"
claimBeliefs can be categorized based on their source or root, such as perceptual, deductive, inductive, memorial, or testimonial.
claimAlvin Plantinga (1993) and Robert Audi (2006) suggest that testimony differs from sources like perception because testimonially-based beliefs can be defeated or trumped by other sources of evidence in ways that perception cannot.
perspectiveGreen argues that it is not clear that testimony is fundamentally different from perception regarding the necessity of holding higher-order beliefs about the source of the information.
claimGreen (2006) excludes beliefs that cannot be perceptually-based, such as mathematical facts, from his argument regarding the epistemic parity of testimony, memory, and perception.
claimBeliefs can be based on multiple sources simultaneously, such as being partly testimonially-based and partly perceptually-based, or partly inductively-based and partly memorially-based.
Epistemology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 3 facts
claimAncient Indian philosophy examines different sources of knowledge, referred to as pramāṇa, with most schools discussing perception, inference, and testimony as sources.
claimEpistemologists investigate sources of justification, including perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony, to discover how knowledge arises.
claimSources of justification are cognitive capacities or methods through which people acquire justification, with commonly discussed sources including perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony.
Social Epistemology - Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science oecs.mit.edu 2 facts
claimEpistemologists hold differing views on whether testimony is a basic source of knowledge, similar to perception or logical reasoning, or a composite type of knowledge that combines perception and inference.
claimThere is a philosophical debate regarding whether testimony is a basic source of knowledge, similar to perception or logical reasoning, or a composite type of knowledge that combines perception and inference.
Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 2 facts
claimFor true beliefs to qualify as knowledge, they must originate from sources considered reliable, which include perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony.
claimFor a belief to qualify as knowledge, it must originate from sources considered reliable, such as perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony, rather than psychological factors like desires, emotional needs, prejudice, or biases.
Epistemological Problems of Testimony plato.stanford.edu 2 facts
perspectiveThomas Reid (1983) argues that whatever reasons exist for considering perception a basic source of justification also apply to testimony as a basic source of justification.
claimEpistemologists debate whether testimony is a basic source of justification or if it can be reduced to other epistemic sources like perception, memory, and inference.
Social Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimReductionism in epistemology is the view that the justification of beliefs derived from testimony can be reduced to justifications provided by other sources such as perception, memory, and induction.
Social Epistemology – Introduction to Philosophy - Rebus Press press.rebus.community 1 fact
claimNon-reductionism faces a phenomenalistic problem because, unlike other sources of justification such as perception, introspection, memory, or intuition, testimony does not inherently present itself as true.