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Eliminativism is a philosophical position that directly addresses the nature of consciousness, with proponents arguing that consciousness as a non-functional phenomenon is a construction to be rejected [1] or an illusion that does not exist [2]. Scholars like Dennett and others have explicitly defended eliminativist perspectives regarding consciousness [3], [4], and [5] to challenge traditional notions of phenomenal experience.
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Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 4 facts
referenceEliminativism regarding consciousness is defended by Rey (1997), Dennett (1978, 1988), Wilkes (1984), and Ryle (1949).
claimEliminativism is a response to the hard problem of consciousness that asserts there is no hard problem because consciousness does not exist.
claimEliminativist views in philosophy of mind resist the idea that human experience is equivalent to consciousness, specifically in the phenomenal or 'what it's like' sense.
claimEliminativists argue that consciousness, when defined as a non-functional or non-relational phenomenon, is a philosopher's construction that can be rejected without absurdity.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
perspectiveModest eliminativists, such as Dennett (1990, 1992) and Carruthers (2000), do not reject the notion of consciousness entirely but take issue with specific features like qualia, the conscious self, or the 'Cartesian Theater' where the temporal sequence of conscious experience is internally projected.
Critique of Panpsychism: Philosophical Coherence and Scientific ... thequran.love 1 fact
claimPanpsychism claims to avoid the eliminativist or epiphenomenalist tendencies of hardline physicalism by refusing to treat consciousness as an illusion or a byproduct with no causal power.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
referenceDaniel Dennett argues for an eliminativist perspective on consciousness in his 1991 book 'Consciousness Explained', suggesting that consciousness is not what it seems.