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Relations (1)
related 2.81 — strongly supporting 6 facts
The epistemic gap is a central philosophical concept used to argue that consciousness cannot be fully explained by physical properties, as evidenced by [1] and [2]. This gap is frequently analyzed in relation to various theories of consciousness, including dual-aspect monism [3], panprotopsychism [4], and the physicalist debate [5], while also serving as a focal point in the work of David Chalmers [6].
Facts (6)
Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org 5 facts
claimEpistemic gaps, defined as the divide between physical knowledge and mental knowledge, suggest that consciousness may not be purely physical.
claimThomas Nagel and Galen Strawson argue that consciousness cannot be constituted by the physical due to the epistemic gap or related considerations.
claimPanprotopsychists who regard the nature of the protophenomenal as unknown might argue that the epistemic gap to consciousness could be closable if that nature were known, though this appeal to ignorance is often considered unconvincing.
claimDual-aspect monism is compatible with the epistemic gap because it regards consciousness as non-physical, similar to dualism.
claimIf an epistemic gap undermines the physicalist claim that consciousness is constituted by the physical, it should also undermine the dual-aspect panpsychist claim that consciousness is constituted by microconsciousness.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
claimVon Stillfried concludes that there are valid reasons for David Chalmers's transition from an epistemological gap to an ontological gap regarding consciousness.