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Relations (1)
related 3.91 — strongly supporting 14 facts
Type-B materialism directly addresses consciousness by positing an a posteriori identity between consciousness and physical processes despite a conceptual gap, accepting consciousness as a real phenomenon distinct from functions [1][2][3][4][5]. David Chalmers critiques this view as failing to explain consciousness, requiring primitive bridging axioms rather than reduction [6][7][8][9][10].
Facts (14)
Sources
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 11 facts
claimDavid Chalmers characterizes Type-B materialism as a 'solution by stipulation' because it asserts that brain states are conscious states without explaining how this identity occurs.
claimProponents of type-B materialism, such as Andy Clark and Valerie Hardcastle, argue that while consciousness is not a priori equivalent to structural or functional properties, it is identical a posteriori, established through correlations between consciousness and physical processes.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that type-B materialism posits an identification in place of an explanation and fails to provide a reductive explanation of consciousness because it relies on an explanatorily primitive axiom to bridge the gap between physical processes and consciousness.
claimType-B materialists argue that a world physically identical to ours but lacking consciousness is conceivable but not 'metaphysically possible' because consciousness is identical to a physical process, a view supported by Valerie Hardcastle and Andy Clark.
claimType-B materialism accepts that there is a real phenomenon of consciousness that is conceptually distinct from the performance of functions, and seeks to account for it through an a posteriori identity between consciousness and physical or functional properties.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers posits that if type-B materialism is accepted, the resulting explanatory picture resembles his own naturalistic dualism more than standard materialism, as it abandons the attempt to explain consciousness solely through physical processes.
claimPhilosophical positions held by Clark and Hardcastle are classified as type-B materialism because they rely on an a posteriori identity between consciousness and physical or functional properties.
claimDavid Chalmers states that a type-B materialist would need to infer bridging principles from systematic regularities between physical processes and phenomenological data, where the latter plays an ineliminable role.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers concludes that Type-B materialism cannot work because explaining consciousness requires an ingredient beyond structure and function, which physical theories do not provide.
claimType-B materialism accepts that there is a phenomenon of consciousness that is conceptually distinct from the performance of functions, but maintains that this phenomenon can still be explained within a materialist framework.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that Type-B materialism requires an appeal to a primitive axiom identifying consciousness with a physical process, which is not derivable from physical facts and differs from identity statements found elsewhere in science.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 3 facts
claimType-B Materialists believe that while there is a gap between introspection and neuroscience that will not be resolved by understanding neurobiology, consciousness and neurobiology are identical in reality.
claimType-B materialism, also known as weak reductionism or a posteriori physicalism, posits that the hard problem of consciousness stems from human psychology rather than a genuine ontological gap between consciousness and the physical world.
claimType-B Materialism refers to the "hard-wired view" of consciousness.