Relations (1)

related 0.50 — strongly supporting 5 facts

The knowledge argument directly targets consciousness by asserting that it cannot be deduced from physical knowledge [1] and aims to establish an anti-physicalist conclusion about qualitative conscious experience [2]. It is also linked to the 'Hard Problem' of consciousness and challenges functional characterizations of it [3][4].

Facts (5)

Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 1 fact
claimThe knowledge argument asserts that consciousness is not physical because knowledge of consciousness cannot be deduced from physical knowledge.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 fact
claimThe continued conceivability of spectrum inversion, the persistence of the 'other minds' problem, the plausibility of the 'knowledge argument' (Jackson 1982), and the implausibility of functional characterizations suggest that no functional characterization of consciousness is available.
What is hard about the “hard problem of consciousness”? philosophy.stackexchange.com Philosophy Stack Exchange 1 fact
claimThe 'Hard Problem' of consciousness claim is built on the same conceptual notions as Frank Jackson's 'Knowledge Argument', which is also known as 'Mary’s Room' or 'Mary the Color Scientist'.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 fact
claimThe knowledge argument and zombie arguments aim to reach an anti-physicalist conclusion about consciousness by highlighting the apparent limits of understanding qualitative conscious experience through third-person physical accounts of brain processes.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com Springer 1 fact
claimRussellian monism is not affected by the conceivability argument or the knowledge argument, and it supports a naturalist view on consciousness while integrating phenomenal and physical properties.