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Nikolaus von Stillfried, as a philosopher, is directly related to the concept of consciousness through his extensive arguments on its nature, such as its discontinuity versus the continuous physical world [1], endorsement of Chalmers's ontological gap [2], and proposals like panpsychism or Russellian monism [3].
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The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 10 facts
perspectiveVon Stillfried expresses discomfort with substance-like concepts of consciousness, such as those found in interactionism and substance dualism, because they imply that physical systems might behave differently depending on whether they interact with 'mind-stuff'.
claimVon Stillfried concludes that there are valid reasons for David Chalmers's transition from an epistemological gap to an ontological gap regarding consciousness.
claimVon Stillfried proposes two options for understanding the involvement of consciousness: either physical and phenomenal properties are always intrinsically correlated (panpsychism), or the phenomenal is an intrinsic essence of the physical (Russellian monism/aspect dualism).
perspectivevon Stillfried (2018) argues that David Chalmers' definition of consciousness is circular because, if experience is assumed to be the only intrinsic evidence, the causal structure of time-space cannot be differentiated from cognitive structures, a problem previously demonstrated by David Hume and Immanuel Kant.
perspectiveVon Stillfried argues that if epiphenomenalism is true, consciousness cannot effectuate physical events, making second-order phenomenal judgments impossible because a zombie twin would utter the same phrases without actual consciousness.
claimVon Stillfried distinguishes between 'strong' epiphenomenalism, which denies any interaction between mind and body, and 'weak' epiphenomenalism, which only denies the causal role of consciousness.
perspectiveNikolaus von Stillfried emphasizes that he does not doubt the existence of consciousness, viewing experience as a fundamental empirical fact, which leads him to find solipsism more plausible than physicalism.
perspectiveVon Stillfried argues that David Chalmers's concept of acquaintance solves the epistemological question of how one knows they have consciousness, but fails to solve the ontological question of why there is concordance between phenomenal experience and physical correlata or whether consciousness is explanatorily relevant.
claimRichard Rorty (1979) presents arguments similar to those of von Stillfried regarding the circularity of definitions of consciousness.
claimVon Stillfried argues that the physical world is continuous, whereas consciousness is discontinuous, as evidenced by the interruption of experience during sleep or coma while the physical world remains stable.