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The 'hard problem' is a specific philosophical challenge defined by David Chalmers to distinguish the subjective experience of consciousness from mechanistically explainable cognitive functions [1], [2]. This relationship is central to the discourse on consciousness, as the 'hard problem' posits that consciousness remains uniquely unexplainable by physical processes alone [3], [4], [5].
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The Problem of Hard and Easy Problems cambridge.org 7 facts
perspectiveThe author argues that a phenomenon exceeding the performance of functions in its vicinity is not a unique property of consciousness, nor does it indicate a mechanistically intractable 'hard problem.'
claimDavid Chalmers argues that consciousness is intrinsically and fundamentally special, posing a 'hard problem' that is unlike any other problem in science.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that while most phenomena in the life sciences are 'easy problems' that can be explained mechanistically, the phenomenon of consciousness is a mechanistically intractable 'hard problem'.
claimDavid Chalmers defines 'easy problems' of consciousness as those characterized by functional definability and mechanistic explainability, while the 'hard problem' is characterized by the absence of these properties.
referenceThe first criterion for distinguishing between hard and easy problems, as presented by David Chalmers, is functional definability. If a phenomenon is functionally definable, it can be explained by specifying a mechanism; however, because consciousness is not about functions, it is not amenable to a mechanistic explanation.
referenceThe 'hard problem' of consciousness is characterized by the fact that it is not a problem about the performance of functions.
claimThe evaluation conducted in the source paper concludes that no proposed criteria for distinguishing between 'hard' and 'easy' problems successfully identifies consciousness as a uniquely mechanistically unexplainable phenomenon.
Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Consciousness and the Intermediate ... frontiersin.org 4 facts
claimThe 'hard problem' of consciousness, GOFAC approaches, and the strong versus weak machine consciousness argument all share a common factor: they treat consciousness as lacking any causal role in the world.
perspectiveThe authors argue that progress in artificial consciousness is hampered by the 'hard problem' premise, which posits that consciousness is distinct from the physical world.
referenceDavid Chalmers introduced the concept of the 'hard problem' of consciousness in his 1996 book, which posits that even after all material facts about a system are fixed, there remains a subjective experience that requires explanation.
claimThe 'zombie' argument in the context of the hard problem refers to a cognitively equivalent agent that lacks consciousness.
(PDF) Cross-Cultural Approaches to Consciousness - Academia.edu academia.edu 2 facts
claimThe scientific community has attempted to answer questions regarding how and where consciousness emerges, but these questions remain unsolved and are considered a 'hard problem'.
claimContemporary studies of consciousness distinguish between two notions of consciousness: one that can be explained by science and another, known as the 'Hard Problem', which cannot.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 2 facts
claimCritics Mills and Price argue that David Chalmers' invocation of fundamental laws to bridge physics and consciousness fails to solve the hard problem, instead providing only a sophisticated set of correlations.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers acknowledges that treating consciousness as fundamental provides a clear research program, effectively turning the 'hard problem' into an 'easy problem' (distinct from the 'Easy problem' of cognitive function) that is not intractable in principle.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 2 facts
referenceBrian Jonathan Garrett authored an article titled 'What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the 'Hard Problem'' published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in May 2006.
quoteA. C. Elitzur argued: "While [GWT] does not address the 'hard problem', namely, the very nature of consciousness, it constrains any theory that attempts to do so and provides important insights into the relation between consciousness and cognition."
Unknown source 1 fact
claimThe 'hard problem' of consciousness is defined as the challenge of understanding why and how physical processes are associated with consciousness, specifically questioning why humans are not simply robots or philosophical zombies.
The “Hard Problem of Consciousness” Arises from Human Psychology pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 1 fact
claimThe 'hard problem' of consciousness emerges from two intuitive biases inherent in human psychology: Essentialism and Dualism.
Psychedelics and Consciousness: Distinctions, Demarcations, and ... blossomanalysis.com 1 fact
claimThe authors of the paper 'Psychedelics and Consciousness: Distinctions, Demarcations, and Opportunities' emphasize the necessity of epistemic humility, specifically advocating for the separation of modest, testable scientific claims regarding the contents and functions of consciousness from stronger, more speculative claims about solving the 'hard problem' of how subjective experience arises.
What is hard about the “hard problem of consciousness”? philosophy.stackexchange.com 1 fact
claimThe 'Hard Problem' of consciousness claim is built on the same conceptual notions as Frank Jackson's 'Knowledge Argument', which is also known as 'Mary’s Room' or 'Mary the Color Scientist'.
David Chalmers Thinks the Hard Problem Is Really Hard scientificamerican.com 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers coined the term 'hard problem' in the early 1990s to distinguish the subjective experience of consciousness from cognitive functions like 'self-monitoring', which he labeled the 'easy stuff'.