Knowledge Tree
Relations (1)
related 2.81 — strongly supporting 6 facts
Mental states are fundamentally linked to propositions as the psychological attitudes held toward them [1] and as the internal evidence that justifies one's belief in a proposition {fact:2, fact:5, fact:6}. Furthermore, mental states are often categorized alongside propositions as primary forms of evidence [2], with necessary principles governing the relationship between the two [3].
Facts (6)
Sources
Epistemic Justification – Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology press.rebus.community 2 facts
claimInternalist theories of epistemic justification imply that if two individuals, Pat and Nat, have identical mental states and are introspectively identical, they are justified in believing the same propositions.
claimInternalism entails that given a person's mental states at a specific time, there is a necessary fact settling which doxastic attitude that person is justified in having toward any proposition at that time.
Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 2 facts
claimEvidentialism asserts that whether one is justified in believing a proposition depends on one's evidence regarding that proposition, and that this evidence consists of one's mental states.
claimThe principle of Necessity asserts that a priori recognizable, necessary principles determine what is evidence for what, allowing one to recognize on reflection whether one's mental states are evidence for a proposition.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimThe traditional view in analytic philosophy defines thoughts as mental states that can be modeled as psychological attitudes toward specific propositions, such as believing, hoping, or fearing.
Epistemology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimEvidence is primarily conceptualized as mental states, such as sensory impressions or known propositions, but can also include physical objects like bloodstains or financial records.