Knowledge Tree
Relations (1)
related 0.60 — strongly supporting 6 facts
Panpsychism and Russellian monism are deeply intertwined, as panpsychism is considered a paradigmatic form of Russellian monism [1] and both frameworks utilize the intrinsic nature of matter to address consciousness [2]. The 'Intrinsic Nature Argument' serves as a shared conceptual foundation for both [3], and they are frequently discussed together in academic literature regarding the nature of phenomenal properties {fact:5, fact:6}.
Facts (6)
Sources
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 3 facts
claimRussellian monism is a contemporary philosophical position that utilizes the panpsychist view of consciousness as an intrinsic nature of matter to address mental causation.
claimThe 'Intrinsic Nature Argument' for panpsychism is closely connected to the motivations behind Russellian monism.
claimThe growing prominence of Russellian monism has led to panpsychism being considered a serious philosophical option, as one paradigmatic form of Russellian monism is panpsychist.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
claimVon Stillfried proposes two options for understanding the involvement of consciousness: either physical and phenomenal properties are always intrinsically correlated (panpsychism), or the phenomenal is an intrinsic essence of the physical (Russellian monism/aspect dualism).
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimGalen Strawson's general argument for panpsychism is a version of the intrinsic nature argument, which is akin to Russellian neutral monism, with the distinction that the substrate is explicitly taken to be experiential in nature rather than metaphysically neutral.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 Edition) plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
referenceThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on panpsychism cites various works on Russellian monism, including collections by Alter & Nagasawa (2015), and works by Feigl (1967), Maxwell (1979), Lockwood (1989), Strawson (1994, 2003, 2016), Chalmers (1996, 2015), Griffin (1998), Stoljar (2001), Pereboom (2011, 2015, 2019), and Goff (2015, 2017, 2019a), with critiques by Howell (2015), Pautz (2015), and Cutter (2019).