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related 2.81 — strongly supporting 6 facts
Russellian monism is positioned as a theoretical alternative to dualism, specifically addressing the limitations of dualism regarding substance and causality as described in [1], [2], and [3]. Furthermore, both concepts are categorized within the broader framework of ontological models that interpret the relationship between consciousness and matter, as noted in [4], [5], and [6].
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Resolving the evolutionary paradox of consciousness link.springer.com 2 facts
perspectiveRussellian panpsychism does not offer a superior explanation for adaptive-seeming correlations compared to physicalism or dualism.
perspectiveRussellian panpsychism avoids the problem of explaining the origin of consciousness, which physicalism fails to answer and dualism addresses by postulating undiscovered fundamental psychophysical laws.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
claimOntological models are often categorized as 'monism' (including neutral monism, dual aspect monism, type-F monism, and Russell's monism) or 'dualism' (including aspect-dualism and naturalistic dualism) based on how they interpret properties as aspects or emergent ontic categories.
Critique of Panpsychism: Philosophical Coherence and Scientific ... thequran.love 1 fact
claimRussellian panpsychism differs from traditional dualism because it does not posit a separate substance of mind, and it differs from standard physicalism because it asserts that current physical science cannot fully describe matter without including consciousness.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 Edition) plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimRussellian monism is proposed as a potential solution to the problems facing both dualism and physicalism by integrating consciousness into the material world and accounting for the causal role of human consciousness.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimRussellian monism attempts to avoid the problems of dualism and physicalism by suggesting that conscious states are the intrinsic nature of brain states, meaning the causal action of brain states and conscious states are the same.