Relations (1)
related 0.50 — strongly supporting 5 facts
Physicalists are directly related to consciousness through their advocacy for a fully reductive physical explanation of it [1][2], placing the burden on non-physicalists to prove its existence beyond the brain [3], with their explanatory failures prompting alternatives like panpsychism [4].
Facts (5)
Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org 2 facts
perspectivePhysicalists, including Smart (1959) and Melnyk (2003), argue that since many functions associated with consciousness, such as information processing and intelligent behavior, have been physically explained, consciousness itself will eventually be fully explained in physical terms.
claimIf an epistemic gap undermines the physicalist claim that consciousness is constituted by the physical, it should also undermine the dual-aspect panpsychist claim that consciousness is constituted by microconsciousness.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimThe continuing failure of physicalists to provide a satisfying account of consciousness toward the end of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century has led many philosophers to explore panpsychism as an alternative.
Do all non-physicalist theories of consciousness face the interaction ... philosophy.stackexchange.com 1 fact
perspectiveThe burden of proof lies with the non-physicalist to justify the claim that consciousness exists outside of the brain, rather than on the physicalist to explain how that claim is excluded from causal closure.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 Edition) plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
perspectivePhysicalists argue for an entirely reductive account of consciousness, panpsychists argue that consciousness is fundamental, and panqualityists argue that the qualitative aspect of consciousness is fundamental while subjectivity is reductive.