Knowledge Tree
Physicalists
Also known as: physicalist
Facts (30)
Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 6 facts
claimPhysicalists, including Smart (1959), Hill (1991), Block and Stalnaker (1999), McLaughlin (2001), and Melnyk (2003), argue that the best explanation for mind-brain supervenience is that conscious states are constituted by the brain states they supervene on.
perspectivePhysicalists argue that the interactionist use of strong emergentism is a speculative possibility lacking clear evidence, and that even if strongly emergent properties exist, they could potentially be explained by the laws of biology and neurology.
perspectivePhysicalists, including Smart (1959) and Melnyk (2003), argue that since many functions associated with consciousness, such as information processing and intelligent behavior, have been physically explained, consciousness itself will eventually be fully explained in physical terms.
claimPhysicalists use the 'argument from mind–brain correlations' to suggest that conscious states are constituted by their correlated physical brain states.
claimPhysicalists use the 'argument from previous explanatory successes of science' to argue that phenomena once thought impossible to explain physically were eventually explained.
claimIf an epistemic gap undermines the physicalist claim that consciousness is constituted by the physical, it should also undermine the dual-aspect panpsychist claim that consciousness is constituted by microconsciousness.
Dualism, Physicalism, and Philosophy of Mind - Capturing Christianity capturingchristianity.com Dec 11, 2019 4 facts
claimPhysicalists must deny property dualism by arguing that either qualia do not exist or that qualia are not something over and above the physical.
claimPhysicalists suggest that the self is a physical object, such as a body or a brain, and that conscious states are ultimately physical states.
claimPhysicalists propose that being in pain is equivalent to being in a specific neurological or functional state, asserting there is nothing more to pain than that state.
claimMost physicalists attempt to reconcile mental life with physicalism rather than denying the existence of mental states.
Do all non-physicalist theories of consciousness face the interaction ... philosophy.stackexchange.com Nov 17, 2025 4 facts
perspectiveThe burden of proof lies with the non-physicalist to justify the claim that consciousness exists outside of the brain, rather than on the physicalist to explain how that claim is excluded from causal closure.
claimPhysicalists do not propose multiple fundamental categories of existence, such as physical and non-physical, and therefore do not have the burden of explaining the link between such categories.
perspectiveThe strongest physicalist position asserts that 'non-physical' is an incoherent concept used as a label for things that do not exist but which people wish to believe exist.
claimPhysicalists classify all existing things into a singular 'physical' category and assume the causal closure of all existence, meaning that non-existent things cannot have a causal effect on existing things.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 3 facts
claimPhysicalists generally accept David Hume's bundle theory unless they wish to ascribe the unity of the mind to the brain or the organism as a whole.
perspectivePhysicalists can accommodate the irreducibility of special sciences if they can reduce psychology, as this would allow them to understand the acts that created the irreducible ontologies of other sciences from the bottom up.
claimDerek Parfit (1970, 1984) and Sydney Shoemaker (1984) accept David Hume's bundle theory as physicalists.
What is hard about the “hard problem of consciousness”? philosophy.stackexchange.com Nov 18, 2020 3 facts
claimThe physicalist premise asserts that all mental events involve physical changes in the brain and are, in principle, causally explicable by those physical changes.
perspectiveThe author of the source text argues that claiming the 'hard problem' of consciousness is only a problem for physicalists is a double standard, as anti-materialists have also failed to provide a complete explanation of how minds work.
claimPhysicalists argue that if RoboMary's physical state is identical to the state that would result from seeing in color, there is no reason to assume she would experience the scene differently than if she were actually seeing in color.
Resolving the evolutionary paradox of consciousness link.springer.com Apr 1, 2024 2 facts
perspectivePhysicalists posit that being aware of a conscious experience is equivalent to being aware of one's own physical brain state.
claimThe physicalist assertion that awareness of a conscious experience is awareness of a brain state clashes with common intuition, as individuals generally lack understanding of the neural transmissions occurring in their brains during an experience.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 18, 2017 1 fact
claimThe continuing failure of physicalists to provide a satisfying account of consciousness toward the end of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century has led many philosophers to explore panpsychism as an alternative.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 1 fact
referenceRoger Penrose (1989, 1994) and Stuart Hameroff (1998) propose theories that may be categorized as physicalist, as the properties involved might be labeled as physical in a completed science.
PANPSYCHISM (Philosophy of Mind Series) - Amazon.com amazon.com 1 fact
referenceThe book 'PANPSYCHISM (Philosophy of Mind Series)' contains 16 essays that feature contemporary arguments for panpsychism, representing different varieties of the theory and including perspectives from both proponents and critics from physicalist and non-physicalist camps.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 Edition) plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 1 fact
perspectivePhysicalists argue for an entirely reductive account of consciousness, panpsychists argue that consciousness is fundamental, and panqualityists argue that the qualitative aspect of consciousness is fundamental while subjectivity is reductive.
The Compatibility of Christianity with Panpsychism, Part 1 theologycommons.gcu.edu Sep 2, 2025 1 fact
claimPhysicalists typically address the problem of consciousness by labeling experience as an illusion, reducing experience to physical phenomena like brain activity, or arguing that non-physical phenomena depend on physical entities.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
claimPhysicalists often characterize their own phenomenal experiences as meaningless byproducts of brain activity, despite experiencing the same rich qualia as dualists or idealists.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimThe hard problem of consciousness is considered a primary challenge for physicalist views of the mind because physical explanations are typically functional or structural in nature.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Jun 18, 2004 1 fact
claimPhysicalists, including P.S. Churchland (1981) and Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992), have disputed dualist arguments based on both a priori and empirical grounds.