Relations (1)
related 3.17 — strongly supporting 8 facts
Epiphenomenalism is a philosophical position specifically designed to reconcile non-physical consciousness with the principle of physical causal closure by denying that mental states have physical effects [1]. The principle of physical causal closure serves as a foundational constraint in debates about mental causation, forcing non-physicalists to choose between epiphenomenalism and other alternatives like overdetermination or the denial of the principle itself {fact:2, fact:3, fact:5}.
Facts (8)
Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org 8 facts
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that their position is less unattractive than the alternatives, specifically claiming that physicalism is refuted by the epistemic gap and interactionism is refuted by physical causal closure.
claimEpiphenomenalism is a philosophical position that reconciles non-physical consciousness with the principle of physical causal closure by asserting that non-physical consciousness has no physical effects.
claimThe argument from physical causal closure requires non-physicalists to choose between epiphenomenalism, overdetermination, or the denial of physical causal closure.
claimOverdetermination dualism is compatible with physical causal closure, similar to epiphenomenalism, but differs by allowing mental states to affect physical states.
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that the lack of elegance in their theory is a moot point if competing theories like physicalism and interactionism are already refuted by the epistemic gap and physical causal closure.
claimThe argument for physicalism states that if the principle of physical causal closure is correct, then epiphenomenalism and overdetermination are unacceptable, and conscious states must be physical to cause physical behavior without overdetermination.
claimThere are four possible positions on mental causation: interactionism (which implies violation of physical causal closure), epiphenomenalism, overdetermination, and physicalism.
claimA primary argument against epiphenomenalism is that phenomenal states appear to cause physical actions, to which epiphenomenalists respond that appearances can be false and that physical causal closure takes precedence.