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• Iran is concerned that Turkey aims to marginalize Iran from transit and energy routes in the South Caucasus.
• Iran's foreign policy toward northern neighbors in Central Asia and the South Caucasus aimed to counterbalance the regional influence of Turkey and Russia.
• Iran's policy toward the South Caucasus is currently a passive measure primarily aimed at mitigating the strategic advancements of Turkey and Azerbaijan.
• Tehran is concerned that the de facto alliance between Israel, Turkey, and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus mirrors US efforts to contain Iran in the Middle East.
• Tehran regards the Zangezur Corridor as part of a broader strategy by Turkey and its NATO allies to destabilize Iran, as it would reduce Iran's geopolitical options by increasing its isolation in the South Caucasus.
• Iran perceives its influence in the South Caucasus as diminishing due to the growing influence of Turkey.
• The Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance is becoming more influential, disrupting the long-standing equilibrium in the South Caucasus that Iran had been accustomed to.
• Russia, Turkey, and Western nations are keen on sidelining Iran from the geoeconomic dynamics of the South Caucasus, specifically regarding East-West energy transfers.
• Tehran historically viewed increased Russian involvement in the South Caucasus as a factor that implied reduced activism by the USA, Turkey, and Israel in the region.
• Turkey is positioning itself as a potential mediator in the South Caucasus to enhance its geostrategic influence throughout the region.
• Iran may utilize the South Caucasus as a new front for its deterrence policy against regional rivals such as Turkey and Israel.
• Iran is more susceptible to the repercussions of local disputes in the South Caucasus than Turkey, Russia, or Georgia due to its geographic proximity.
• Iran advocates for a '3+3' regional framework for the South Caucasus, which would include the three South Caucasus countries alongside Russia, Iran, and Turkey.
• The underlying threat perception regarding Turkey's potential actions in the South Caucasus remains a critical factor driving the regional rivalry between Iran and Turkey.
• Russia, Turkey, and Iran (the founders of the 'Astana Format') have sought to apply collaborative conflict management approaches used in Syria to the South Caucasus.
• Iran interprets Turkey's pan-Turkic initiatives in the South Caucasus as part of a broader strategy by Ankara to reinvigorate the Turkic world, specifically through the Organization of Turkic States, which includes Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan.
• Russia and Turkey have expanded their influence in the South Caucasus over the past decade, positioning the region as a key element within a geopolitical chessboard extending from the Mediterranean to the Caspian Sea.
• The expanding roles of Turkey and Israel, in partnership with Azerbaijan, have increased Iran's strategic concerns regarding the South Caucasus.
• The establishment of the Middle Corridor would diminish the influence of Russia, Iran, and China in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, while simultaneously elevating the roles of Turkey and the European Union in Eurasian geoeconomic affairs.
• The operationalization of the Turkey-Nakhchivan-Baku route could position Turkey as a favored partner for China in West Asia, sidelining Iran in the South Caucasus transit dynamics.
• Turkey, Israel, and European states are asserting their influence more forcefully in the South Caucasus, contributing to growing complexities for Iran.
• Iran's failure to achieve its objectives in the South Caucasus has left it exposed to Turkey's regional ambitions.
• Russia's declining dominant position in the South Caucasus is allowing other actors, specifically Turkey and China, to increase their influence in the region.
• The relationship between Iran and Turkey is witnessing an intensified direct and indirect rivalry in the South Caucasus.
• Russia and Turkey played decisive roles in the South Caucasus following the 2020 Karabakh war, while Iran was sidelined in the region's emerging geopolitical dynamics.
• Iran is apprehensive that Turkey may seek to establish the Zangezur Corridor, which would open a new front in the South Caucasus.
• Iran views Turkey as its primary competitor in the South Caucasus regarding geoeconomics.
• Velayati linked recent events in the South Caucasus to American efforts to extend its strategy of containing Iran to the north, positioning the Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance as a proxy.
• Turkey is unlikely to escalate the situation in the South Caucasus as long as instability persists in Syria, because unpredictable developments in the Levant prevent Turkey from shifting its focus entirely to another front.