Knowledge Tree
Relations (1)
cross_type 3.00 — strongly supporting 7 facts
Green explores the epistemic parity between perception, memory, and testimony [1], [2], and examines whether testimony is fundamentally distinct from perception regarding higher-order beliefs [3], [4]. Additionally, Green discusses the role of human agency in perception [5] and uses perceptually-based beliefs as a baseline for his arguments [6], [7].
Facts (7)
Sources
Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 7 facts
perspectiveGreen argues that epistemic parity between testimony, memory, and perception is a more economical and likely true account of epistemic phenomena than accounts that distinguish sharply between the three sources.
perspectiveGreen (2006) argues that it is unclear whether testimony is fundamentally different from perception regarding the necessity of higher-order beliefs about the source.
claimGreen argues that human agency is already potentially at stake in cases of perception, such as the possibility that someone has substituted a fake object.
claimGreen suggests that transforming perceptually-based beliefs into testimonially-based beliefs involves anthropomorphizing sense faculties by imagining a world where sense faculties are operated by individuals who present messages about the environment, resulting in the same structure of explanation for epistemic status.
claimGreen argues that the epistemic parity of testimony, memory, and perception follows from the epistemic innocence of transformations that turn instances of testimonially-based beliefs into instances of beliefs based on the other two sources, preserving the structure of the explanation of epistemic status.
perspectiveGreen argues that it is not clear that testimony is fundamentally different from perception regarding the necessity of holding higher-order beliefs about the source of the information.
claimGreen (2006) excludes beliefs that cannot be perceptually-based, such as mathematical facts, from his argument regarding the epistemic parity of testimony, memory, and perception.